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One Nation, Under . . . The Watchmaker?: Intelligent Design and
the Establishment Clause
Nicholas A. Schuneman*
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly eighty years, American courts have mediated the debate
between creationists and evolutionists. As one scholar has shown,
American creationists’ legislative campaign against the Theory of
Evolution can be broken down into three eras: (1) the era of antievolution legislation, (2) the era of balanced treatment statutes, and (3)
the era of minimization.1 The first era, characterized by outright bans of
evolutionary theory in public school curricula, reached its climax in the
famous “Scopes Monkey Trial”2 and ended with the Supreme Court’s
declaration in Epperson v. Arkansas that anti-evolution statutes violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.3 After Epperson
halted creationist attempts to exclude the Theory of Evolution from
public school curricula, creationists adopted a new strategy, supporting
legislation that requires “equal treatment” for evolution and creationism
in science courses. This tactic was quashed by the Supreme Court in
Edwards v. Aguillard on the rationale that such legislation served no
secular purpose; thus ended the era of balanced-treatment statutes.4 The
third era, which continues to the current day, involves primarily subtle
attacks designed to minimize the role of the Theory of Evolution in
public education as well as to diminish its credibility in the eyes of
students. These attacks have taken the form of attempts to eliminate
evolutionary theory from state standardized tests, the use of disclaimers
which marginalize the Theory of Evolution and suggest creationism as a
viable alternative, and the presentation of scientific and philosophical
“evidence” against evolution to either imply or directly support the

*
The author would like to thank Richard Fallon for his invaluable support and advice throughout the
research and writing process. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
1. Lisa D. Kirkpatrick, Note, Forgetting the Lessons of History: The Evolution of
Creationism and Current Trends to Restrict the Teaching of Evolution in Public Schools, 49 DRAKE
L. REV. 125, 130–40 (2000).
2. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
3. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
4. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1, at 135; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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hypothesis of creation by a supernatural agent.5
Without a doubt, the most intriguing and controversial weapon in the
creationist’s third-era arsenal is the Intelligent Design hypothesis. A
subtle variant of its philosophical predecessor, so-called “creation
science,” the Intelligent Design hypothesis has captured the imagination
of Christian fundamentalists and inspired anger and angst among
Darwinian loyalists. In contrast to its precursors, however, the Intelligent
Design hypothesis has been championed by highly-qualified academics
that support the hypothesis with sophisticated arguments. Many of the
hypothesis’ proponents have participated in public debates with
evolutionists, and major universities have sponsored scholarly symposia
on the topic of Intelligent Design. Several public school boards, backed
by faith-based think tanks, have considered including the Intelligent
Design hypothesis within their science curricula,6 and legal scholars have
published defenses of the Intelligent Design hypothesis against claims
that such curricula would violate the Establishment Clause.7 Prominent
national politicians, such as President George W. Bush and Senator Bill
Frist, have chimed in on the topic, proclaiming their support for
Intelligent Design in public schools.8
Following the trail first blazed by its metaphysical precursors,
Creationism and Creation Science, Intelligent Design soon found its way
into a federal courthouse. In the case of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School
District,9 the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania became the first federal court to address the
constitutionality of public school instruction on the Intelligent Design
hypothesis. The court, in an exceptionally meticulous opinion by Judge
John E. Jones, applied both the endorsement and Lemon tests in reaching

5. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1, at 135.
6. The Kansas State Board of Education heard testimony from several Intelligent Design
advocates in the procedures leading up to its revised 2005 science standards. While the Board did
not incorporate the Intelligent Design hypothesis into the required curriculum, it was careful to note
that the Science Education Standards “neither mandate nor prohibit teaching” the hypothesis. See
Kansas Science Education Standards, Draft 2(d). The Dover, Pennsylvania school board went so far
as to adopt a resolution requiring that students “be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin’s theory
and of other theories of evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent design.” The resolution
and its application were recently held to violate the Establishment Clause. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area
Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
7. See, e.g., Francis Beckwith, Science and Religion Twenty Years After McLean v.
Arkansas: Evolution, Public Education, and the New Challenge of Intelligent Design, 26 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 455 (2003); see also Stephen L. Marshall, Note, When May a State Require Teaching
Alternatives to the Theory of Evolution? Intelligent Design as a Test Case, 90 KY. L.J. 743 (2002).
8. See Daniel C. Dennett, Op-Ed., Show Me the Science, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, § 4, at
11.
9. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707.
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its decision.10 The court held that the Dover Area School District’s policy
requiring instructors to introduce students to the Intelligent Design
hypothesis would be perceived as state endorsement of religion, that the
policy was motivated by a religious purpose, and that the policy had as
its only effect the advancement of religion.11 The holding rested on three
independent observations about the Intelligent Design hypothesis: (1) its
intellectual roots in the creationist movement and its almost exclusive
support by fundamentalist Christians, (2) its fundamentally religious
nature12 and (3) its failure to satisfy the generally-accepted requirements
of a scientific theory.13 Judge Jones’ reliance on multiple independent
grounds leaves no legal or logical room in which Intelligent Design
advocates might maneuver. However, the Kitzmiller opinion’s robustness
serves to obscure the issue of what kinds of ideas may be taught in public
schools. Although the Kitzmiller court was willing to find Intelligent
Design—with its open and obvious ties to identifiable and unarguably
religious organizations—unconstitutional, it is not entirely obvious that a
court would be so quick to identify ideas similar to the Intelligent Design
hypothesis, but lacking its ties to recognizable religious groups, as
religious notions. As long as judges can point to sectarian advocates for
ideas that dwell in the murky margins between religion and science, they
need not take a bold stand on the nature of ideas themselves. It is simply
not that controversial to categorize a claim as religious if its proponents
are culled exclusively from religious advocacy groups. But what
becomes of similar metaphysical claims without ties to recognizable,
traditional faiths?
This paper examines the constitutionality of teaching the Intelligent
Design hypothesis in public schools, but with a more directed focus than
Judge Jones’ opinion in Kitzmiller. Instead of dwelling on the religious
pedigree of the Intelligent Design hypothesis, as have other analyses of
the issue,14 the paper focuses on the constitutional consequences of the
hypothesis’ substantive claims. In other words, the intent is to evaluate
the constitutionality of Intelligent Design on the basis of the claims it
makes, and not on the motivations of those who make them. It is hoped

10. Id. at 712.
11. Id. at 765–66. The particular policy at issue mandated that teachers read ninth-grade
biology students a statement that challenged the validity of the Theory of Evolution and introduced
and encouraged students to explore the concept of Intelligent Design. In addition, the policy required
that the book Of Pandas and People be made available for students’ reference. See id. at 708–09.
12. Id. at 716–23.
13. Id. at 716–23, 735–46.
14. See, e.g., Jay Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV. 439, 463–
66 (1997).
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that, in doing so, we might clarify the boundary separating those ideas
that may be taught in public schools without offending the Establishment
clause from those that may not and reduce the courts’ reliance on tracing
an idea’s intellectual pedigree to determine its constitutional status. In
this sense, the Intelligent Design hypothesis serves as an example of a
broad class of marginally religious notions that may find their way into
public school curricula, and the analysis herein serves as a template for
evaluating the Establishment Clause consequences of presenting these
ideas to schoolchildren. Section II presents a primer on the Intelligent
Design hypothesis, exploring the contours of the hypothesis by
comparison to its metaphysical rival, the Theory of Evolution. Section III
provides an overview of the Establishment Clause framework within
which the constitutionality of the Intelligent Design hypothesis will be
evaluated. In Section IV, public school instruction on the Intelligent
Design hypothesis is explored under this framework. It is shown that
while religious notions such as the Intelligent Design hypothesis may not
be presented in the context of science courses without offending the First
Amendment, there may be room for such ideas in other educational
contexts. Section V addresses the complementary notion that instruction
on the Theory of Evolution violates the Establishment Clause, and
Section VI provides concluding remarks and observations.
Before moving on, it is important to note three key limitations of the
analysis presented in this paper. First, the analysis that follows is limited
to public elementary and secondary schools. Second, claims made about
the nature of the Intelligent Design hypothesis extend only to the
hypothesis itself, and not necessarily to the evidence or arguments
offered in support of the hypothesis. Finally, the following analysis
proceeds without regard for the intellectual pedigree of the Intelligent
Design hypothesis or the religious affiliations of its proponents. This
final limitation allows us to focus on the constitutional consequences of
the hypothesis’ substantive claims and, therefore, to generate a dialogue
applicable to a wider range of potential ideas. With these caveats in
mind, the constitutionality of public school instruction on the Intelligent
Design hypothesis is discussed below.
II. PRIMER ON INTELLIGENT DESIGN
The Intelligent Design hypothesis is primarily a response to and
critique of the theory of evolution by natural selection (hereinafter, “the
Theory of Evolution”), which was first elaborated by Charles Darwin in
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his classic work, The Origin of Species.15 Thus, to understand the
Intelligent Design hypothesis, one must first comprehend the basic
structure of its analytical foil: the Theory of Evolution.
A. The Theory of Evolution
The Theory of Evolution is a generic term for the scientific notion
that modern earthly species emerged as the result of a long, slow process
of gradual variation from an ancient common ancestor.16 According to
the modern Theory of Evolution, commonly known as “neo-Darwinism,”
the variation of species’ phenotypes (i.e., physical form) reflects a
variation in their genotypes (i.e., the genetic code constituting a
“blueprint” for a given phenotype).17 Such variation in the genotype can
occur because of randomly occurring mutations between generations or
the blending of genetic material in the process of sexual reproduction.
Variations that result in a subsequent benefit to the new generation are
sustained and propagated in a process known as natural selection. Over
long periods of time, minor variations accumulate and result in
significant alterations. Thus, the modern Theory of Evolution is
fundamentally an accounting for the variety of species by a historical
process of intergenerational variation, driven by genetic modification and
natural selection, from a common ancestor.18
Charles Darwin is typically credited with introducing the concept of
evolution by natural selection.19 Although his ideas have proven
exceptionally powerful as an organizational and explanatory theory for
biology, Darwin was not the first naturalist to propose the concept of
evolution. Other theorists, such as Jean Baptiste Lamarck, suggested that
variation among modern species was likely due to a process of gradual
evolution from simple species to more complex ones.20 However, Darwin
was the first to propose that the evolution of species was due to the
relative advantage conveyed to certain phenotypic variations within a
species—those better suited to survival and reproduction will reproduce
more often, according to Darwin, thus leading to a predominance of the

15. R. J. BERRY, NEO-DARWINISM 2 (1982).
16. Id. at 5.
17. See generally id.
18. Id. at 16–26.
19. See NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 420 (3d ed. 1993).
20. Id. at 424. Lamarck is famous for his notions of “use and disuse”—whereby
characteristics of an organism adapt, during its lifetime, to fill the organism’s survival needs—and
“inheritance”—whereby the adaptations are passed hereditarily to the adapted organism’s
descendents. Id.
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advantageous phenotypic variation in subsequent generations.21 In other
words, optimal phenotypes emerged and gained dominance through a
process of unguided survival of the fittest, otherwise known as “natural
selection.” Darwin’s notion of evolution by natural selection was
eventually merged with Mendelian genetics, which offered an underlying
explanation for the phenotypic variation within species that fueled
Darwinian evolution.22 Together, the systematic study of genetics and the
process of natural selection have yielded a powerful analytical system,
known as neo-Darwinism, capable of accounting for the wide variety and
complexity of earthly species.23
Since its introduction by Darwin, the Theory of Evolution has been
modified and adjusted to better account for empirical data. While
Darwin’s basic framework of evolution by natural selection still forms
the core of evolutionary theory, some aspects of the current theory
appear to contradict Darwin’s ideas. One particularly salient example is
the notion of “punctuated equilibrium,” which was formulated to explain
the relatively rapid appearance of new species in the evolutionary
timeline.24 Darwin believed that natural selection leads to gradual,
smooth evolution of species in the direction of ever-increasing
complexity and optimity over time.25 This model fails to account for
anomalous periods of rapid diversification of species revealed by the
fossil record.26 Modern theorists, such as Niles Eldredge and Stephen
Gould, have proposed mechanisms to account for these short periods of
rapid variation that occur between longer periods of relative evolutionary
stasis.27 While punctuated equilibrium, as this modern theory is called,28
may seem to contradict evolutionary theory, it is best read as the type of
minor adjustment all scientific theories undergo as the available data
sample grows. In fact, at least one scientist has argued that Eldredge and
Gould’s hypothesis is “something that followed from long-accepted
conventional Darwinism, properly understood.”29 Another classic
example of an accepted alteration to Darwin’s original theory is the
incorporation of Mendelian genetics, now a fundamental component of
21. Id. at 427–28.
22. Id. at 439; see also BERRY, supra note 15.
23. Neo-Darwinism is so potent and useful as a description of the evolution of species on
Earth that “[t]he scientific consensus around evolution is overwhelming.” STEERING COMM. ON SCI.
AND CREATIONISM & NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, SCIENCE AND CREATIONISM: A VIEW FROM THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 28 (2d. ed. 1999) [hereinafter STEERING COMM.].
24. See CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 469.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 236 (1996).
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the modern understanding of evolution.30
The details of the Theory of Evolution are likely to continue
evolving as scientists adapt the theory’s structure to account for newly
discovered data. However, one key feature of the theory is certain to
remain constant: no matter how many adjustments are made, the Theory
of Evolution will always be a naturalistic model.31 In other words, the
Theory of Evolution will always be one that explains the emergence of
species exclusively in terms of observable, natural phenomena. This
quality is crucial in differentiating the theory from many of its
competitors, including the Intelligent Design hypothesis.
B. Intelligent Design
Although this paper focuses on the metaphysical claims of Intelligent
Design—and argues that these claims alone are likely sufficient to render
the inclusion of the Intelligent Design hypothesis in public school
science curricula unconstitutional—it is useful to at least briefly explore
the history of the hypothesis’s intellectual development.32 The modern
Intelligent Design hypothesis has its roots in the work of eighteenthcentury theologian William Paley, who famously argued that design
could be inferred from complexity, precision, and purpose.33 In his
treatise, Natural Theology—or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes
of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature, Paley employed
the example of a mechanical watch found in a field.34 Faced with such a
stunning specimen of complex, precise, and purposeful machinery, the
watch’s finder would be compelled to presume that the watch was
created by a “maker . . . who comprehended its construction, and

30. Although unaware of Mendel’s work, Darwin had realized the need for some mechanism,
which he deemed “chance,” to explain the appearance and transmission of variations between
generations. Darwin’s “chance” was eventually supplanted by Mendelian genetics. WALTER J.
WILKINS, SCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 20–21 (1987).
31. By many accounts, Darwin’s main goal was to remove the supernatural from biology and
replace it with a natural mechanism. See id. at 18. Darwin’s theory thus represented a form of
methodological revolution in the study of biology. Id. at 27.
32. Some scholars and courts—including Judge Jones in the recent Kitzmiller case—have
focused on Intelligent Design’s intellectual pedigree, arguing that the hypothesis’ fundamentalist
Christian roots reveal a surreptitious religious motive on the part of its advocates. While this
argument is powerful, this paper argues that the religious motivations of those who developed
Intelligent Design are not the sole reason that its inclusion in public school curricula is
constitutionally problematic. Rather, this paper demonstrates that the inherently religious nature of
the Intelligent Design hypothesis—irrespective of the affiliation of its proponents—leads to potential
conflict with the Establishment Clause.
33. See DAWKINS, supra note 29, at 4.
34. See generally WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY (2d ed. 1828).
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designed its use.”35 Paley’s general argument resurfaced in the 1989
supplemental biology textbook Of Pandas and People.36 In 1991, law
professor Phillip Johnson published Darwin on Trial, which outlined an
attack on the methodological naturalism that underlies the Theory of
Evolution.37 The Intelligent Design movement gained steam in 1996 with
the publication of Lehigh University biochemist Michael Behe’s critique
of Darwinism, Darwin’s Black Box.38 Soon after Behe’s work was
published, mathematician and philosopher William Dembski added to
the growing Intelligent Design literature with a series of publications
including The Design Inference (1998), Mere Creation (1998), and
Intelligent Design (1999). In 1999, Johnson and other fellows of the
Discovery Institute’s Center for Renewal of Science and Culture
prepared the now-infamous “Wedge Document,” which outlined a plan
to “replace [a materialist view of science] with a science consonant with
Christian and theistic convictions.”39
The rise of the Intelligent Design hypothesis in recent years has been
attributed to the creationists’ defeats in court, such as those in Epperson40
and Edwards,41 coupled with their persistent desire to incorporate theistic
notions into the public school science curriculum.42 The Intelligent
Design hypothesis is merely the most recent incarnation of the basic
creationist analytical system.43 It is also the subtlest incarnation to date:
while the creationist systems of earlier eras were characterized by
complex, detailed, and dogmatic explanatory theories of the origins of
life as well as outright identifications of a responsible deity, the
Intelligent Design hypothesis proposes merely that empirical data
supports the inference of a vaguely-defined intelligence responsible for
the emergence of species.44 In this sense, Intelligent Design avoids two
common pitfalls of the earlier creationist systems: (1) it does not propose
a complex set of falsifiable historical claims about the origins of life that
35. Id. at 5–6. The title of this paper is a clumsy play on Paley’s famous metaphor.
36. Eugenie C. Scott, Antievolutionism and Creationism in the United States, 26 ANN. REV.
OF ANTHROPOLOGY 263, 279 (1997). Pandas was published shortly after the decision in Edwards v.
Aguillard (discussed infra). For an interesting analysis of the differences between the pre and postEdwards draft of Pandas and the implication that the authors substituted Intelligent Design-related
terminology for more obvious creationist arguments to conform with Edwards, see Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
37. See Scott, supra note 36, at 281.
38. Id. at 282.
39. Discovery Institute Center for Renewal of Science and Culture, The Wedge 4.
40. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
41. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
42. See Bob Holmes & James Randerson, A Skeptic’s Guide to Intelligent Design, NEW
SCIENTIST, July 9, 2005, at 12.
43. Id. at 10.
44. Id.
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contradict geological and paleontological evidence, and (2) it does not
identify, with specificity, the proposed designer of life.45 The first quality
of Intelligent Design is important mainly from the standpoint of public
opinion: that Intelligent Design advocates avoid contradicting wellsettled science46 lends a degree of legitimacy to the movement. Because
it does not squabble with the most concrete and cherished simulacra of
the Theory of Evolution, Intelligent Design appears to the layman more
like a competing scientific theory than religious dogma. Also, because
the Intelligent Design hypothesis lacks an accompanying historical
narrative, its relation to any specific theological tradition is obscured.
That Intelligent Design is a religious hypothesis subject to the strictures
of the First Amendment is thus not immediately apparent. The second
quality provides the Intelligent Design advocates with additional room
for constitutional maneuvering: because no deity is identified by name,
the religious nature of Intelligent Design is less clear than that of earlier
creationist systems.
A handful of variations of the Intelligent Design hypothesis exist, but
they all share a common structure: each represents a critique of the
naturalist Theory of Evolution on scientific grounds that culminates in
the conclusion that the diversity of earthly species could only have
emerged as a result of the purposeful actions of an intelligent agent. As
used by Intelligent Design proponents, the term “intelligence” implies
several qualities, including: (1) the ability to plan, (2) at least
rudimentary knowledge and competency in chemistry and biology, and
(3) purpose.47 Taken together, the intelligent designer differs from the
unguided natural processes that underlie the Theory of Evolution in the
sense that the designer can construct molecules (or organisms) in a
systematic, directed manner for an intended purpose.48 The logical
structure of the arguments offered in support of the Intelligent Design
hypothesis can be understood by focusing on a syllogism underlying the

45. Id. at 11.
46. For instance, many Intelligent Design proponents are often careful to acknowledge the
truth of “microevolution,” a term used to describe the variation within a species from one generation
to the next. See id. at 10. This is prudent because microevolution is readily observed in laboratory
experiments and fieldwork (one significant example of real-world microevolution is the gradual
acquisition of drug-immunity in pathogens). Also, Intelligent Design advocates do not overtly
contradict the general historical timeline typically associated with the Theory of Evolution or the
notion of a common ancestor. See id.
47. Intelligent Design theorist William Dembski defines intelligence as the ability of the
designer to choose. See William Dembski, Intelligent Design as a Theory of Information, 49 PERSP.
ON SCI. AND CHRISTIAN FAITH 180, 186–88 (1997).
48. The Intelligent Design hypothesis is, in this sense, a teleological model of the origin of
species, explaining the emergence of complexity in terms of purposeful action. The modern Theory
of Evolution, with its basis in undirected natural selection, eschews teleological explanation.
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naturalist Theory of Evolution. The validity of the Theory of Evolution
depends on the truth of the proposition that the current species on Earth
may be traced back through a lineage of natural processes. This
proposition must apply in a discrete form at every step in the
evolutionary timeline and at every location in the evolutionary tree, so
that each variation may be understood as the effect of a natural cause; if,
at some point in evolutionary history, the naturalist proposition fails, then
the naturalistic Theory of Evolution cannot provide a comprehensive
accounting of the origin of species. Those who advocate Intelligent
Design exploit this fact, claiming that “gaps” exist in the naturalist causal
chain.49 According to Intelligent Design theorists, these supposed gaps in
the Theory of Evolution evince design, which one researcher defines as
“the purposeful arrangement of parts.”50
The various versions of the Intelligent Design hypothesis therefore
do not differ in logical structure; rather, the distinction appears in the
support—in the form of the specific “gap” claimed to exist in the
naturalist theory or the type of argument employed to demonstrate that a
gap in fact exists—provided for the hypothesis that life’s complexity is
due to purposeful design by an intelligent agent. William Dembski takes
a probabilistic approach, arguing that the complexity and specificity of
life renders its emergence simply too improbable without the direction of
an intelligent, purposeful designer.51 Along this vein, Dembski defines an
“explanatory filter” which allows one to identify the cause—from three
possible options: regularity, chance, and design—of an observed event.52
Dembski claims that evolution by natural selection, which focuses on
regularity and chance, is insufficient to account for the emergence of the
“complex, specified information” that comprises organic life.53 Thus, the
source of such information—and, by implication, life—must be an
intelligent designer.54 Biochemist Michael Behe takes this argument one
step further, asserting that while gradual evolution from simpler organic
systems to more complex ones is possible (and, in fact, happens), such a
process is insufficient to comprehensively account for the origins of
life.55 Behe starts by noting that life is composed of component parts—
cells, organs, and systems—that, according to the Theory of Evolution,
arose in their current form through gradual variation from more primitive
49. MICHAEL BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX 187 (1996).
50. Id. at 193.
51. See generally WILLIAM DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE
THROUGH SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998).
52. Id. at 37.
53. Dembski, supra note 47, at 181–86.
54. Id. at 186–88.
55. BEHE, supra note 49, at 23–25.
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precursors.56 He then asserts that we can infer design of a component part
that is both (1) too complexly organized to have arisen spontaneously
and (2) too streamlined and/or interconnected to function in a simpler
form; component parts that satisfy these two criteria are said to be
“irreducibly complex.”57 The logic of Behe’s argument is simple: if
gradual variation (a hallmark of evolution by natural selection) cannot
account for the origins of irreducibly complex parts, then those parts
must have appeared suddenly. Since the spontaneous organization of
molecules into a complicated organic system is exceedingly unlikely, it
is more reasonable to infer that these parts were designed. Behe cites
several examples of supposed irreducibly complex systems from the
realm of biology—including bacterial cilia and flagella,58 the blood
coagulation cascade,59 antibodies,60 and AMP biosynthesis61—that, in his
view, evince design.62
Despite the different approaches taken by various Intelligent Design
theorists to support their critique of the Theory of Evolution, each
culminates in a common inference: namely, the necessity of a designer.
In other words, in contrast to the Theory of Evolution, the Intelligent
Design hypothesis claims that the complexity underlying life on Earth
could not have arisen without the interference of a purposeful and
capable designer at some point in our planet’s history. It is this proposed
designer that is the key difference between the Intelligent Design
hypothesis and the Theory of Evolution and, as will be shown below, it is
a concept that is fundamentally religious.

56. Id. at 3–23.
57. Id. at 194–96. The most famous example of an irreducibly complex system is the
household mousetrap, which consists of a board, a spring, a lever arm and a latch. If the mousetrap is
asserted to have evolved in a manner analogous to naturalistic evolution, it must have arisen from
very simple, initially unconnected component parts (maybe a board, an unbent wire, etc.) to the more
complex form. Behe asserts that this is unlikely to have happened, because the components by
themselves are useless for trapping mice; only a complete mousetrap, constructed of the components
arranged in a very specific manner, is useful for the intended purpose. The mousetrap—a relatively
simple device—is, according to Behe, therefore irreducibly complex. Id. Numerous naturalists have
attacked the power and relevance of this analogy. See, e.g., Keith Robison, Irreducible Complexity
or Irreproducible Irreducibility? (1996–97), http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/behe/review.html.
58. BEHE, supra note 49, at 51–73.
59. Id. at 74–97.
60. Id. at 117–39.
61. Id. at 140–61.
62. Id. at 187–208.
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III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE FRAMEWORK
The proper relationship between religion and the state is defined by
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states in
pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”63 Read literally, the
First Amendment Religion Clauses apply only to acts of the United
States Congress. However, the clauses have, over time, come to stand for
the prohibition of state action—whether legislative or executive, federal,
or state-level—that either affects an establishment of religion or burdens
the free exercise of religious beliefs.64 The inclusion of the Intelligent
Design hypothesis in public school curricula raises issues that primarily
involve religious establishment.65 To gain an understanding of whether
the Intelligent Design hypothesis runs afoul of the Establishment Clause,
one must determine whether the Intelligent Design hypothesis implicates
“religion” and whether its inclusion in the public schools qualifies as a
“law respecting an establishment of religion.”
A. Definition of “Religion”
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment only purport to
regulate “religion;”66 their application is limited by the text of the
Amendment to those teachings, beliefs, and groups that legitimately
qualify as religion. Thus, before we evaluate the Intelligent Design
hypothesis under the lens of the Establishment Clause, we must first
determine whether the hypothesis involves religion. Unfortunately, no
explicit definition of the term “religion” may be found in the text of the
Constitution. However, several extra-constitutional sources help to
construct a useful and somewhat rigorous definition of “religion” as it is
applied in the First Amendment. First, the words of influential Framers
of the Constitution provide some clues to the original intent of the
Religion Clauses. Second, there is a small amount of relevant federal
case law that addresses the issue. Finally, some core characteristics of
religion may be extracted from the work of anthropologists who have
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253–58 (1963).
65. It has been suggested that the general curricular conflict between the Theory of Evolution
and the Intelligent Design hypothesis raises a complementary issue involving the Free Exercise
Clause—namely, whether teaching a scientific theory that, by implication, contradicts certain
closely-held religious convictions is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. See McLean v. Ark. Bd.
of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1273–74 (E.D. Ark. 1982). The validity of such a claim is beyond the
scope of this paper.
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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studied religion. These sources, and a proposed test for religiosity of an
analytical system such as the Intelligent Design hypothesis or the Theory
of Evolution, are described below.
1. Views of the framers
The expressed views of the Framers can often illuminate the
intended meaning of ambiguous terms that appear in the Constitution. In
the case of the Religion Clauses, the writings of two influential
framers—James Madison and Thomas Jefferson—provide insight into
the originally-intended definition of the term “religion.” In his Memorial
and Remonstrance, Madison referred to religion as “the duty which we
owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it.”67 This definition
includes three distinct components: (1) the notion of a creator, (2) a duty
owed to the creator, and (3) guidelines for fulfilling this duty. Jefferson,
in his Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, implicitly defined
“religion” through a non-exhaustive list of extant religions.68 The list
included only faiths demonstrating sophisticated theologies and ritual
practices and centered on belief in a supernatural entity, but Jefferson
noted that his Act was intended to be “universal” and to apply to
“infidel[s] of every denomination.”69 It is notable that each of the faiths
listed by Jefferson would qualify as a religion under Madison’s creationcentric definition.
2. Relevant jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has remained largely silent on the issue of the
definition of religion. However, a few opinions have flirted with the
definitional question. Writing for the Court in Davis v. Beason, Justice
Field largely echoed the words of Madison, defining religion as “one’s
view of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of
reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.”70
Justice Brennan, in Edwards v. Aguillard, described the belief “that a
supernatural being created humankind” as a “religious viewpoint.”71
Taken together, these two opinions clearly identify the belief in a
67. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785) (quoting VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776)).
68. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION 133 n.1 (William Addison
Blakely ed., rev. enl. ed. 1911). The religions listed by Jefferson included Judaism, Christianity,
Islam and Hinduism.
69. Id.
70. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
71. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1986).
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supernatural creator as a religious notion.
Two other notable Supreme Court opinions have implied an
expanded definition of religion, albeit in the context of the Free Exercise
Clause. In Torcaso v. Watkins, Justice Black implied the possibility of
non-theistic religion, insisting that the state may not “aid those religions
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs.”72 Unfortunately, Justice Black’s opinion
did not elaborate on the particular qualities of these non-theistic belief
systems that would qualify them as religions. In United States v. Seeger,
the Court interpreted the definition of the term “religion” as applied in
Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Services Act.73
Despite the fact that the statute employed a definition of religion that was
explicitly theistic, the Court read the Act’s definition to subsume nontheistic belief systems that “occup[y] a place in the life of [their]
possessor[s] parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”74
However, the Court stopped short of labeling any and all belief systems
“religious,” noting that the statute could exclude “essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views” from protection.75 Seeger thus
implies that, in addition to theistic belief systems, some, but not all, nontheistic belief systems may qualify as religion.
At least one federal circuit court has attempted to clarify the fuzzy
boundary between religion and non-religion. Judge Adams of the Third
Circuit formulated an initial definition of religion in Malnak v. Yogi76
and later refined the definition in Africa v. Pennsylvania.77 Known as the
“Adams Test,” the definition notes three indicia of religious belief
systems: religious systems (1) “address[] fundamental and ultimate
questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters,” (2) are
“comprehensive in nature” and (3) often involve “formal and external
signs” such as organized rituals, recognized experts, and official texts.78
One salient feature of this test is that it includes no explicit requirement
of belief in the supernatural or a creator. However, while the supernatural
creator concept is not a necessary condition under the Adams Test, it is
surely a sufficient condition. After all, it is difficult to imagine a clearer
attempt to “address fundamental and ultimate questions” than the
proposal that a supernatural being created the universe.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 165.
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1032.
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3. Anthropological understanding
The legal sources, especially the relevant Supreme Court precedent,
leave us with a rather ill-defined understanding of exactly what belief
systems qualify as religions worthy of First Amendment scrutiny. While
it is clear that the major theological faiths, their “equivalents,” and even
some non-theistic systems qualify as religion, there is no underlying
unity that ties these views together. One source that might shed some
light on the definitional question is the work of anthropologists of
religion. As one legal scholar has argued, “‘Religion’ in the First
Amendment [m]eans [r]eligion.”79 If this was the intent of the Framers,
then there is no better source for a definition of religion than the work of
those who catalogue and categorize human religious practices. After all,
religion is fundamentally a term to describe specific collections of beliefs
and practices of human beings. It is therefore appropriate to study these
behaviors in an effort to define the term that purports to classify them.
According to James Donovan, the various anthropological
definitions of religion fall into four distinct categories based on the
particular criterion—content, behavior, mental effect, or function—
applied to sort religion from non-religion.80 Because the Religion
Clauses are most powerful as applied to either protect or prohibit certain
beliefs, expressions, and behaviors, the most useful definition for the
purposes of constructing a legal definition of religion is likely to be of
either the content-based or behavioral variety. For the limited purpose of
this paper, which evaluates the constitutionality of teaching the idea of
Intelligent Design, it is sufficient to focus our attention on the
construction of a content-based definition.
Several anthropologists have proposed content-based definitions of
religion. Anthropologist Edward Tylor asserts that the “minimum
definition of religion” is a belief in the supernatural.81 Similar views have
been expressed by Anthony Wallace and Raymond Firth.82 Emile
Durkheim proposes a definition of religious belief based on the
distinction between the “sacred” and the “profane.”83 The supernatural
deity so common to religion is merely a special—albeit the most
common—example of a “sacred being.” Interestingly, Durkheim
79. Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 802 (1997).
80. James M. Donovan, Defining Religion, in SELECTED READINGS IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY
OF RELIGION 61, 72 (Stephen D. Glazier & Charles A. Flowerday eds., 2003).
81. Paul Bloom, Is God an Accident?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2005, at 105.
82. See Donovan, supra note 80, at 72.
83. “The division of the world into two domains, one containing all that is sacred and the
other all that is profane—such is the distinctive trait of religious thought.” EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 34 (1995).
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explicitly notes that “the fundamental task of sacred beings has been to
maintain the normal course of life by positive action.”84 Pascal Boyer, in
his book Religion Explained: the Evolutionary Origins of Religious
Thought, constructs a multi-faceted definition of religion.85 Among the
components of religion listed by Boyer is belief in supernatural agents
capable of exercising practical control over the events of the natural
world.86 According to Boyer, religions range from simple forms—in
which adherents believe in supernatural agents that affect their lives,
practice rituals to appease these agents, share their beliefs with an
identifiable group, and recognize spiritual experts in their community—
to highly sophisticated theological systems that provide throngs of
adherents with uniform, official doctrine concerning the role of supreme
deities in matters of universal import.87
In summary, the content-based definitions proposed by
anthropologists typically center on belief in the supernatural. But, how
useful is this definition? Donovan asserts that “[a] content definition
highlighting supernaturalisms would be the best kind of definition if it
collocated phenomena as we demand,” but notes that such definitions are
both under- and over-inclusive.88 Supernatural content-based definitions
are under-inclusive because they fail to identify as “religious” systems—
such as Buddhism—that, despite their lack of supernatural concepts, are
almost unanimously considered religious. Such definitions are overinclusive because they count as “religious” items—such as superstitions
and folktales—that are generally not considered religious.89 Thus, a
simple dichotomy of the religious from the non-religious based on the
inclusion of supernatural concepts maps only roughly our intuitive
notions about what qualifies as religion. However, while the three

84. Id. at 26. Durkheim further notes that religious deities are most often used to account “for
the normal march of the universe, the movement of the stars, the annual growth of vegetation, the
perpetuation of species, and so forth.” Id.
85. See generally PASCAL BOYER, RELIGION EXPLAINED: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT (2001).
86. Id. at 136–47. The other components Boyer lists are group identity, ritual practices,
integration of a moral system, the existence of recognized specialists, special beliefs about death and
(in some cases) the existence of a standardized theology. Unlike belief in supernatural agents,
however, none of these components is unique to religion. Id.
87. Id. at 265–96. According to Boyer, the practical, self-centered, often theoretically
incoherent or incomplete beliefs in supernatural agents are more typical of religious beliefs than are
the theoretical, universal, coherent and complete systems that typify the established, theological
faiths. The latter version has incorporated certain qualities necessary to facilitate the incorporation of
multiple peoples into a unified religious constituency. See generally id.
88. Donovan, supra note 80, at 76–77.
89. See id. Durkheim also decries the over-inclusiveness of a content-based definition based
on the inclusion of supernatural concepts, noting that such a definition would label as religious those
systems rightly deemed “magical.”
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content-based definitions of religion introduced above differ significantly
in their details and sophistication, a careful comparison of the three
reveals a more precise commonality than mere inclusion of supernatural
ideas: all three definitions subsume within their bounds belief systems
that propose causation by one or more supernatural agents, where agency
is defined roughly as “the abstract quality that is present in animals,
persons, and anything that appears to move of its own accord, in
pursuance of its own goals.”90 This common theme provides a foundation
for a test applicable to the constitutional issues surrounding Intelligent
Design.
4. A proposed test
Constructing a rigorous and comprehensive definition of religion is
an exceedingly difficult task; even expert religious anthropologists
cannot agree on a common definition. Jurists seeking a test that neatly
divides religion from non-religion are searching in vain. The traditional
legal sources discussed above fail to provide a definition of religion that
is simultaneously rigorous and exhaustive. The term is not clearly
defined in the text of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court’s
treatment of the definitional question has been somewhat evasive. While
the Court has clearly stated that religion includes theological faiths based
on belief in a supernatural creator and some other non-theistic faiths,91 it
has failed to articulate a clear boundary between the realms of the
religious and non-religious. The Third Circuit has elaborated an
apparently rigorous method to identify religious systems,92 but the test
was designed primarily for Free Exercise claims and its application has
therefore been plagued by overzealous rigor.93 Fortunately, a rigorous

90. BOYER, supra note 85, at 144.
91. See discussion supra Part III.A.2; cases cited supra notes 70–78.
92. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d
Cir. 1979). These cases set forth the Adams Test. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
93. E.g., Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D.N.J. 1983). In Jacques, the District
Court for New Jersey applied an especially strict reading of the Adams Test, holding that a prisonbased “church” was not a religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. The court based its
ruling largely on the observation that the church’s doctrines were somewhat vague and did not
follow necessarily from the nature of the church’s deity. Opinions such as Jacques can likely be
explained by the policy issues unique to Free Exercise claims applied to supposedly religious
practices (as opposed to religious beliefs). Religions are relatively easy to found; no special training
or certification is necessary to start one’s own faith. This fact could be exploited by disingenuous
practitioners who seek, by fashioning a customized religious doctrine, to shield otherwise illegal or
unethical behaviors from legal proscription. Courts, faced with the prospect of accommodating
idiosyncratic belief systems at the expense of public policy, might simply choose to avoid the issue
by interpreting the definition of “religion” so narrowly as to exclude the controversial system at
issue from protection.
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and comprehensive definition of religion is not necessary for analysis
under the Establishment Clause. In order to prove a violation of the
Establishment Clause, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that a complete
religion has been installed; rather, under the Supreme Court’s current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the plaintiff need only demonstrate
that the state conduct at issue improperly involves (i.e., respects an
establishment of) a religious belief or practice.94 Thus, what is required
is a means to distinguish between those beliefs and practices that are
religious and those that are not.
A synthesis of the relevant legal and anthropological efforts to define
religion reveals at least one element—namely, the attribution of
causation for natural phenomenon to the work of a supernatural agent
intervening within the natural order95—that distinguishes religious and
non-religious belief. Many anthropologists suggest that such notions are
essential to religious thought.96 While some legal commentators have
argued that religion may include more than just belief systems that
involve supernatural agency, almost all recognize such belief systems as
the baseline for comparison.97 In fact, much of the theoretical work
regarding the definition of religion—both in jurisprudence and
anthropology—has focused on what systems besides those that involve
belief in supernatural agency qualify as religion.98
We can therefore propose a non-exhaustive test that identifies an
idea as religious if it invokes supernatural agency as the cause of
observed, natural phenomena. Such a non-exhaustive test, based on the
notion of supernatural agency, largely avoids the definitional pitfalls
identified by Donovan. Because it requires supernatural agency and
application to real-world phenomena, the test minimizes overinclusiveness: superstition and magic involve supernatural causation, but
almost never invoke supernatural agency; folktales are works of fiction
that do not purport to explain actual, observed phenomena (i.e., they do
not make historical causal claims). The supernatural agency definition
does not eliminate the under-inclusiveness problem, but the definition is
nonetheless quite useful as a legal standard. While the supernatural
94. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
95. A special case of the intervening supernatural agent, the idea of a supernatural creator,
has been especially associated with religion by our nation’s most influential legal scholars. From
James Madison to Justice Field in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), to Justice Brennan in
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), belief in a supernatural creator has consistently been
considered undeniably religious. See generally supra Parts III.A.1–3 for discussion of the definition
of religion.
96. See supra Part III.A.3, with examples including Tylor, Wallace, Firth, and Boyer.
97. See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.
98. See supra Part III.A.2 for discussion of religious definition jurisprudence and supra Part
III.A.3 for discussion of anthropological definitions of religion.
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agency definition may prove under-inclusive in the sense that it fails to
identify systems that, despite their lack of supernatural agency, should
legitimately be deemed “religious,” we can be confident that any system
that includes such notions is, indeed, religious.99 A definition based on
notions of supernatural agency may therefore apply as a first-cut test,
identifying ideas that are unambiguously religious and leaving open the
possibility that a system which fails to meet its criteria may,
nevertheless, be legitimately religious.
It is not sufficient, however, to note merely that the proposed legal
test of religiosity satisfies the concerns of anthropologists; a legal
definition must also conform to the relevant jurisprudence. The
supernatural agency test satisfies the latter criteria as well. In fact, in the
Religion Clause jurisprudence, systems that invoke supernatural agency
to explain natural phenomena serve as the exemplar against which all
other systems’ religiosity is judged. The Madisonian view of religion,
based as it is on belief in a Creator deity,100 is merely a special case of
belief systems that invoke supernatural agency to explain natural
phenomena. Jefferson operated under a definition of religion that
incorporated a general class of theistic beliefs, but every example of faith
cited by Jefferson in his Act for Establishing Religious Freedom includes
notions of supernatural agency. The Supreme Court has often applied the
Madisonian definition of religion.101 On the rare occasions that the Court
has diverged from Madison’s view, it has moved towards a more
inclusive definition of religion, by expanding religion to include certain
non-theistic systems.102 While the Court has found that some systems
that lack belief in supernatural agency qualify as religion,103 it has never
held that the notion of supernatural agency fails to qualify as a religious
belief. Even the Adams Test confirms this view, as it is essentially an
expansion of the definition of religion outward from a core definition
based on belief in supernatural agents.104 Defining religious beliefs as
those that involve supernatural agents generally—as opposed to the
narrower subclass of theologically sophisticated deities—is consistent
with the courts’ tendency to apply constitutional protection to a wide

99. This is not to say that such systems are religions. As noted earlier, what constitutes a
complete religion is unclear; it must therefore suffice to identify beliefs and practices that are of a
religious character.
100. MADISON, supra note 67.
101. See discussion supra Part III.A.2; cases cited supra notes 70–71.
102. See discussion supra Part III.A.2; cases cited supra notes 72–73.
103. Id.
104. “[T]he important question . . . is how far the constitutional definition of religion extends
beyond the Theistic formulation; that it comprehends all Theistic faiths has, to my knowledge, not
been questioned.” Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 1979).
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range of legitimately religious beliefs beyond those of the major world
faiths as well as the universality of Jefferson’s understanding of religion.
The supernatural agency test therefore provides a paradigm that, at
least in part, harmonizes the relevant Religion Clause jurisprudence with
the anthropological understanding of religious belief. Although it is
under-inclusive in that it does not identify non-theistic views as religious,
the supernatural agency test serves as a good “first cut” at determining a
belief system’s religiosity. As it turns out, the supernatural agency test is
all that is needed to determine whether the Intelligent Design hypothesis
is a religious notion.
B. Establishment Clause Tests
The Supreme Court has, over the past several decades, established at
least three tests for evaluating whether a government action complies
with the Establishment Clause. These three tests are introduced below.
1. The Lemon test
The first test applied by the Supreme Court to evaluate
Establishment Clause claims was formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.105
The Lemon test specifies three requirements of government conduct; if
the conduct fails on any one of the three, it violates the Establishment
Clause. “[T]he government conduct in question (1) must have a secular
purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.”106 The secular purpose prong of the Lemon
test “aims at preventing [government] from abandoning neutrality and
acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious
matters.”107 The second prong dictates that the state “may not place its
prestige, coercive authority, or resources behind a single religious faith
or behind religious belief in general.”108 And, the third prong aims to
maintain administrative separation between the government and religious
organizations. The Lemon test served as the Supreme Court’s exclusive
Establishment Clause test in the period between 1971 and 1984,109 but
105. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), aff’d 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
106. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 485 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Lemon, 430 U.S. at
612–13), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
107. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
108. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
109. See id. The lone exception was Marsh v. Chambers, in which the Supreme Court upheld
the Nebraska legislature’s practice of opening daily sessions with a prayer. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The
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has since been supplemented with at least two other tests.
2. Endorsement
The Supreme Court began to retreat from the formal, three-pronged
structure of the Lemon test in Lynch v. Donnelly.110 In a concurring
opinion in Lynch, Justice O’Connor proposed an alternative test that
would find a violation of the Establishment Clause when the government
conduct either (1) fostered “excessive entanglement with religious
institutions” or (2) affected an “endorsement or disapproval of
religion.”111 Although Justice O’Connor’s test has not supplanted the
Lemon test as the governing standard in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence,112 a plurality of the Court adopted Justice O’Connor’s test
in County of Allegheny v. ACLU and the Court has since applied it to
numerous Establishment Clause cases.113
Whether a state action affects an endorsement of religion depends on
the message the action conveys to a reasonable, objective observer.114
The Supreme Court defined the role of an objective observer in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, noting that “[i]n cases involving
state participation in a religious activity, one of the relevant questions is
‘whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state
endorsement of [the religious activity at issue].’”115 In determining the
perception of an objective observer, the court must consider the context
of the religious activity116 with the understanding that the reasonable,
decision in Marsh was grounded in the unique history of legislative prayer. See id.
110. Lynch v. Donelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
111. Id. at 687–88 (O’Conner, J., concurring).
112. In fact, at least one circuit court has read the endorsement test as a mere restatement of
the Lemon test. “Justice O’Connor’s ‘endorsement’ test effectively collapsed the first two prongs of
the Lemon test.” Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 486 (9th Cir. 2002).
113. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
114. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 869 (2005).
115. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73, 76 (1985)).
116. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (stating that “the effect of the government’s use
of religious symbolism depends upon its context”). One interesting ambiguity in the endorsement
test is whether the objective observer must recognize the religious nature of a state policy. Although
the relevant case law is unclear on this issue, there is good reason to believe that the reasonable,
objective observer’s detection of a policy’s religiosity is a prerequisite to a finding of
unconstitutional endorsement. For example, the analysis in Lynch v. Donelly focused on whether the
policy “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders.” 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). This
message is communicated only if the nonadherents to a religion detect that the message is religious
in nature. Similarly, Laurence Tribe has noted that “[w]hether a given practice constitutes a
forbidden establishment may ultimately depend on whether most people would view it as religiously
significant.” LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1187 (2d ed. 1987).

200

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

objective observer is “presumed to be familiar with the history of the
government’s actions and competent to learn what history has to
show.”117
3. Coercion
The third Establishment Clause test applied by the Supreme Court
was introduced in Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court implied that some
state policies so clearly violate the Establishment Clause that it is
unnecessary to evaluate their merits under the Lemon test.118 Writing for
the Court in Lee, Justice Kennedy enunciated the principle that “at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise to
act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so.’”119 According to the majority in Lee, a junior high school
violated the Establishment Clause’s prohibition of religious coercion
when it invited a clergyman to recite “nonsectarian” opening and closing
prayers at a school graduation ceremony.120 The majority found the
prayer coercive, despite the fact that both attendance at the graduation
ceremony as well as participation in the prayer were voluntary.121 The
Court held that the public and peer pressure on students to “maintain
respectful silence” during the prayer was coercive.122 This seems to
imply that the Establishment Clause not only prohibits the state from
coercing religious exercise, but also forbids any state policy that would
expose a captive audience—even if attendance is formally voluntary—to
religious practice. Lee thus clarifies the baseline anti-coercion guarantee
of the Establishment Clause and sets a rather low bar for what qualifies
as “coercion.”

117. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 869.
118. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
119. Id. at 587. (quoting Lynch v. Donelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). The Ninth Circuit has
apparently taken Justice Kennedy’s characterization of the minimum requirements of the
Establishment Clause at face value, asserting that where the coercion test is violated by state
conduct, there is no need to evaluate the conduct under either the Lemon or endorsement tests. See
Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2002).
120. See Lee, 505 U.S 577.
121. Id. at 593. The Court noted that, while attendance was technically voluntary, the
graduation was such a significant event that it would be improper for the state to “exact religious
conformity from a student as the price of attending [it].” Id. at 596.
122. Id. at 593.
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IV. DOES TEACHING INTELLIGENT DESIGN VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?
Given the recent publicity surrounding the Intelligent Design
hypothesis, and especially the drive to include material about the
hypothesis in public school science curricula, it is important to determine
whether such an inclusion would pass muster under the Establishment
Clause. The analysis that follows tackles this issue in two parts. First, it
is established that, despite the sophisticated, scientific quality of the
support for the Intelligent Design hypothesis, the hypothesis is
fundamentally a religious notion. Next, the constitutionality of teaching
religious ideas in public schools is evaluated for three distinct academic
domains: the hard sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.
While the Establishment Clause likely prohibits instruction on religious
ideas—specifically, the Intelligent Design hypothesis—in the context of
the hard sciences, it is argued that such instruction may be
constitutionally permissible within the context of the social sciences and
humanities.
A. The Intelligent Design Hypothesis Is a Religious Notion
Observers who are exposed to the Intelligent Design hypothesis for
the first time will likely be struck by its technical and philosophical
sophistication as well as the vagueness surrounding the identity of the
hypothesized designer. These qualities do not arise by accident. The
creationist movement has gradually moved towards ever-more-subtle
analytical systems consistent with their core belief in a supernatural
creator. Following on the heels of the Court’s rejection of “balanced
treatment” statutes, which mandated that the standard Genesis account be
taught alongside evolution in public schools, the “creation science”
movement argued for Biblical creation using scientific-sounding
arguments.123 The courts rejected creation science as an attempt to
circumvent the Establishment Clause by shrouding religious dogma in a
cloak of scientific terminology.124 Opponents of the theory of evolution
then pinned their hopes to the subtler and more abstract Intelligent
Design hypothesis.125 However, despite its abstraction and the technical

123. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
124. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). “The legislative history therefore reveals
that the term ‘creation science,’ as contemplated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies
the religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind.” Id. at
591–92.
125. Kitzmiller, 400 F.Supp.2d 707. See also Holmes & Randerson, supra note 42.
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sophistication of its supporting arguments, the Intelligent Design
hypothesis is no less a religious notion than are Biblical Creation and
Creation Science. As will be shown below, the Intelligent Design
hypothesis argues for the conclusion that a supernatural agent has exerted
control over the natural universe and is, therefore, a religious hypothesis.
The notion that the Intelligent Design hypothesis is science, and thus not
religion, is addressed in the subsection that follows.
1. The intelligent design hypothesis explains natural phenomena by
positing interference by a supernatural agent.
In its prior incarnations, the creationist analytical system differed
from the Theory of Evolution in many significant respects. Earlier
versions of creationism proposed specific narrative accounts of the
creation of life on Earth—accounts that clearly conflicted with the fossil
record and genetic research.126 However, the Intelligent Design
hypothesis takes a much subtler approach. Instead of confronting the
mountains of scientific data supporting the Theory of Evolution head-on,
the Intelligent Design theorists apply scientific and mathematical
rationales to support their hypothesis.127 Prominent Intelligent Design
advocates even acknowledge the existence of evolutionary processes,
most notably the process known as “microevolution.”128 Intelligent
Design therefore represents a shift of the metaphysical fault lines from
the heart of biological dogma to the frontiers of research in the life
sciences. Intelligent Design advocates do not contradict the work
biologists have already completed and verified; rather, they propose that
the fundamental naturalist framework of science cannot solve those
biological puzzles that remain, as-of-yet, unsolved.129 It is on this frontier
that we discover the true distinction between the Theory of Evolution
and the Intelligent Design hypothesis—namely, that the former searches
for natural causes at every turn, while the latter allows for (and even
relies upon) the intervention of supernatural agents in the natural
universe.

126. See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 19.
127. WILLIAM DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND
THEOLOGY 106 (1999) (“What has emerged is a new program for scientific research known as
intelligent design.”).
128. See BEHE, supra note 49, at 22 (“This is not to say that . . . Darwinism fails to explain
anything (it explains microevolution very nicely) . . . .”).
129. DEMBSKI supra note 127, at 112–13. This characteristic of the Intelligent Design
hypothesis has earned it the unflattering nickname “God in the Gaps Theory” among its detractors—
the idea being that Intelligent Design proponents find room for their theistic beliefs in the gaps of
scientific understanding (gaps that, over time, inevitably shrink or close).
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Those who support instruction on the Intelligent Design hypothesis
often emphasize that the hypothesis never identifies the designer as any
particular deity, or even as a deity at all.130 However, this purposeful
ambiguity surrounding the identity of the designer is superficial. The fact
remains that the designer in the Intelligent Design hypothesis is one that
acts outside the bounds of the laws of nature; in other words, the designer
is a supernatural agent. This fact is evident from the admissions of
Intelligent Design theorists. According to William Dembski,
“[i]ntelligent design is three things: a scientific research program that
investigates the effects of intelligent causes; an intellectual movement
that challenges Darwinism and its naturalistic legacy; and a way of
understanding divine action. Intelligent design therefore intersects
science and theology.”131 Other Intelligent Design advocates—including
Michael Behe, Scott Minnich, and Steven William Fuller—have
indicated that the Intelligent Design hypothesis necessarily implies the
intervention of a supernatural agent.132
But the supernatural nature of the intelligent designer is not merely a
subjective choice of Intelligent Design theorists. Rather, the supernatural
character of the designer is necessary if, as its advocates assert,
Intelligent Design is to provide a distinct alternative to the Theory of
Evolution. As Richard Dawkins has pointed out, “[i]f we want to
postulate a deity capable of engineering all the organized complexity in
the world, either instantaneously or by guiding evolution, that deity must
have been vastly complex in the first place. The creationist . . . simply
postulates an already existing being of prodigious intelligence and
complexity.”133 In other words, any designer capable of creating the
complex, specified information comprising life from scratch must itself
possess sufficient complexity to carry out the creation. Because the
Intelligent Design hypothesis proposes the designer as an alternative to
the emergence of complexity from natural processes, the designer’s
complexity must have arisen from processes that lie outside the bounds
of the natural; otherwise, the Intelligent Design hypothesis would be
forced to rely on naturalistic processes to explain the emergence of the
necessarily-complex designer from an initial state of simplicity. In other
words, the Intelligent Design hypothesis without a supernatural creator is
an Intelligent Design hypothesis that acknowledges Darwinism as the
explanation for the emergence of the intelligent designer. This watereddown version of the Intelligent Design hypothesis would not amount to a
130.
131.
132.
133.

See, e.g., BEHE, supra note 49, at 250–51.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
DAWKINS, supra note 29, at 316.
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refutation of the Theory of Evolution, but rather would constitute an
historical theory that inserts an intelligent, but naturally created, designer
into the timeline of evolution.134 This is not what the Intelligent Design
hypothesis proposes; rather, Intelligent Design theorists propose a
designer that is, by logical necessity, a supernatural agent.
We can thus determine, based on the admissions of Intelligent
Design theorists and an argument from logical necessity, that the
Intelligent Design hypothesis proposes the interference of a supernatural
agent in the natural world as an explanation for observed phenomena. As
was shown in Section III.A, attributing causality for natural phenomena
to a supernatural agent is a fundamentally religious concept. That this
supernatural agent is not identified by name or attributed
anthropomorphic qualities is irrelevant.135 Thus, the core proposition of
the Intelligent Design hypothesis—the key distinction between it and its
metaphysical competitor, the Theory of Evolution—is a religious notion.
2. The notion that intelligent design is “science” is irrelevant.
Intelligent Design advocates have argued that the technical
sophistication of the hypothesis qualifies it as “science,” and, thus
renders the hypothesis immune from the strictures of the Establishment
Clause.136 Even assuming the specious first premise of this syllogism to
be correct, the argument is invalid. The Constitution does not dictate that
science be taught in public schools. Rather, the Establishment Clause
prohibits the teaching of religion in public schools.137 So, whether the
Intelligent Design hypothesis is science or not is irrelevant if it is
determined that the hypothesis is a religious notion.138 To understand
134. The logical possibility that such a designer could affect the evolution of species is not
controversial. Human beings currently fill this role when they apply selective breeding or
sophisticated gene-modification techniques to purposefully adjust the course of evolution.
135. Pascal Boyer emphasizes the abstraction of the “spirits” the belief in whom forms the
core of many simplistic religious systems. See BOYER, supra note 85, at 139–40 (noting that the
Kwaio people of the Solomon Islands are “remarkably vague as concerns the exact nature of the
adalo [the supernatural agents around which Kwaio religious life revolves].”).
136. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 736 (noting that defense expert Michael Behe
“admitted that his broadened definition of science, which encompasses ID, would also embrace
astrology.”); see also Beckwith, supra note 7, at 470 (characterizing Intelligent Design advocates as
“a small, though growing, platoon of academics who maintain that intelligent agency, as an aspect of
scientific theory-making, has more explanatory power . . . than the blind forces of unguided
matter.”). Beckwith goes on to argue that methodological naturalism may be discarded as a
precondition of natural science, opening the door to an expanded definition of science that would
subsume the Intelligent Design hypothesis. See id.
137. See Wexler, supra note 14, at 466.
138. The Kitzmiller holding was based in large part upon the notion that the Intelligent Design
hypothesis does not qualify as science. Although the court’s resolution of this question is certainly
reasonable, given the predominant philosophical understanding of science, the court operated under
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why, we must explore the relationship between the realms of scientific
and religious inquiry, as these realms are typically defined, and then
examine how the Intelligent Design hypothesis’ location within these
realms changes—if at all—with the implementation of an expanded
definition of “science.”139
Science and religion, as we have defined the two, actually fulfill
quite similar functions. According to our limited test for religiosity, any
hypothesis that assigns causation for natural phenomena to a supernatural
agent is a religious idea. Science, at its most fundamental level, also
seeks to determine the causes of natural phenomena.140 In contrast to
religion, however, science is limited to the realm of natural causes.141
According to Harvard evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr, “scientists do
not invoke the supernatural to explain how the natural world works.”142
Scientists, in other words, proceed under the limitations of
methodological naturalism, “the belief that science should explain
phenomena only in terms of entities and properties that fall within the
category of the natural, such as by natural laws acting either through
known causes or by chance . . . .”143
a false presumption that its “conclusion on whether [the Intelligent Design hypothesis] is science. . . .
is essential to [the court’s] holding that an Establishment Clause violation has occurred . . . .”
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735. Once the court had determined that the hypothesis was a religious
idea, determining whether or not it simultaneously qualified as science is irrelevant from a First
Amendment standpoint.
139. It is critical here to note the distinction between the Intelligent Design hypothesis and the
arguments offered in support of it. While the support for the Intelligent Design hypothesis may arise
through the scientific processes of observing phenomena and collecting and processing data, the
hypothesis itself represents a religious notion.
140. See ARTHUR PAP, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 251 (1962)
(stating that “it is indeed true and truistic to say that science, or at least the sciences dealing with
change (as distinct from purely classificatory sciences), aim at the discovery of causal
connections.”); see also SAMIR OKASHA, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 49 (2002) (arguing that many
philosophers favor a general theory of scientific explanation centered on the concept of causality).
141. See STEERING COMM., supra note 23, at 25 (“Scientific investigators seek to understand
natural phenomena by observation and experimentation. Scientific interpretations of facts and the
explanations that account for them therefore must be testable by observation and experimentation.
Creationism, intelligent design, and other claims of supernatural intervention in the origin of life or
of species are not science because they are not testable by the methods of science.”).
142. ERNST MAYR, THIS IS BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF THE LIVING WORLD (1997), reprinted
in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TEACHING ABOUT EVOLUTION AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
43 (1998).
143. Edward B. Davis & Robin Collins, Scientific Naturalism, in SCIENCE AND RELIGION 322
(Gary B. Ferngren ed., 2002). Methodological naturalism is to be contrasted with another related
principle, ontological naturalism, which implies that “nature is all there is.” Id. According to Davis
and Collins, “in every discipline today, except in some schools of theology, a strict methodological
naturalism is observed, and typically an ontological naturalism is presupposed by most of the
practitioners of these disciplines.” Id. at 327. The latter claim amounts only to an observation about
the personal epistemologies of many scientists, and does not reflect an overarching principle of
scientific thought, just as the fact that “many scientists are deeply religious” does not redefine the
boundaries of science and theology as disciplines. STEERING COMM., supra note 23, at ix.
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Science and religion, as defined herein, may thus be viewed as two
different types of what might be called “causal-analytic systems”—i.e.,
systems that seek to identify the causes for observed natural phenomena.
While causal-analytic systems are often metaphysical systems—systems
that “attempt to say what reality is”144—they need not be: one may set
limits on the type of causes that are consistent with the principles of a
given causal-analytical system without claiming that such limits are
coincident with the bounds of reality. The key distinction between
religious and scientific causal-analytic systems is that while the former
attribute causation to supernatural agents, the latter is limited to the realm
of natural—that is, observable, testable, repeatable—causes. Thus,
scientific and religious thought, as we have defined the two, “occupy two
separate realms” within the same general class of causal-analytic
systems.145 While both religious systems and sciences are classes of
causal-analytical systems generally (which also includes causalanalytical systems, such as superstitions, that are neither religious nor
scientific), no system is both “religious” and “scientific” according to our
definitions. The two categories are mutually exclusive.
What Intelligent Design advocates such as Michael Behe and Francis
Beckwith argue is that if the definition of science can be expanded
beyond its classically-defined bounds to accommodate supernatural
agency, then Intelligent Design would qualify as “science.”146 This may
certainly be true. However, it is beside the point. Such an expansion of
the bounds of science would simply reclassify religious systems as a
subset of scientific systems. It is within this subset that the Intelligent
Design hypothesis would dwell. Intelligent Design would not, by virtue
of its inclusion in the broadened definition of science, cease to qualify as
a religious system; it would simply qualify as both a scientific and a
religious system.
Because adjusting the definition of science does not divest the
Intelligent Design hypothesis of its religious nature, arguments that rely
on Intelligent Design’s science-like philosophical and technical
sophistication or the argument that a requirement of methodological
naturalism is philosophically arbitrary are constitutionally irrelevant.
Whether the Intelligent Design hypothesis is nominally science or
supported by scientific arguments, the hypothesis is unequivocally
religious. Therefore, inclusion of the Intelligent Design hypothesis in
public school curricula is subject to the strictures of the Establishment
Clause.
144. ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE BIG QUESTIONS 88 (1982).
145. STEERING COMM., supra note 23, at ix.
146. See supra note 136.
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B. Intelligent Design and the Establishment Clause Tests
Given that the Intelligent Design hypothesis is a religious notion, we
must determine whether the Establishment Clause prohibits its inclusion
in the public school curriculum. The presentation of religious ideas is not
off-limits to the state in all circumstances. The Supreme Court has
allowed state association with religious ideas in several non-educational
contexts, including daily prayers at a state legislature147 and the display
of religious symbols on municipal property.148 Additionally, the Court
has hinted at contextual distinctions that would allow the presentation of
religious concepts in public school.149 A rationale for these distinctions is
explored below, followed by a constitutional analysis of religious
instruction in the three main academic domains: the hard sciences, the
social sciences, and the humanities.
1. Constitutional analysis depends on the academic domain
While the Establishment Clause generally stands for the proposition
that all religions and non-religions are equal under the law, not all
courses of study are equal under the Establishment Clause. Justice
Fortas, in a 1968 opinion that nullified (on Establishment Clause
grounds) a state law prohibiting the teaching of Darwinian theory in
public schools, noted that “study of religions and of the Bible from a
literary and historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, need not collide with the First Amendment’s
prohibition.”150 Justice Fortas’ view represents an intuition that the
constitutionality of public school instruction on religious principles
depends on the academic domain in which the principles are presented.
This intuition has been echoed by legal scholars such as Kent Greenawalt
and Jay Wexler, who argue for a greater infusion of religion in public
school humanities and social science courses.151
What lies behind these intuitive notions of a constitutionally
meaningful distinction between religious concepts as taught in the
various academic domains? Research by educational theorists examining
the phenomenon of “domain differences” in education—the notion that
147. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
148. See Lynch v. Donelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
149. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
150. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106.
151. See Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J.L. & POL. 329
(2002); see also Jay Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion,
Civic Education and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2002).
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students and instructors make epistemological distinctions between
knowledge obtained in different academic domains—may provide one
explanation for the instinctive desire of legal scholars to differentiate
between the Establishment Clause consequences of religion as taught in
various contexts. Educational psychologists have documented
differences in students’ and teachers’ perception of the epistemological
quality of knowledge associated with the various fields of academic
study. For example, empirical studies demonstrate that students tend to
associate mathematics with certainty and uniqueness of knowledge and
to view mathematics instructors as authoritative sources of knowledge in
the subject.152 One study illuminated distinct attitudes on the part of fifthgrade students towards mathematics and social studies: while the
substance of mathematics courses was viewed as “fixed and immutable,”
knowledge in social studies courses was seen as “less sharply
defined.”153 The same study also indicated that, while students are
confident in their ability to learn social studies through independent
study, they were more likely to believe mathematics knowledge can only
be obtained with the aid of a teacher.154 Other researchers investigating
middle school and high school students’ epistemological attitudes
towards the sciences have suggested that, similar to mathematics,
students view the sciences as conveying knowledge that is factual,
certain, independent of context, and dependent on authority for
justification.155 Another study indicates that first-year college students’
epistemological perceptions of science and psychology differ

152. See Magdalene Lampert, When the Problem Is Not the Question and the Solution Is Not
the Answer. Mathematical Knowing and Teaching, 27 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 29 (1990); see also A.
Schoenfeld, Learning to Think Mathematically: Problem Solving, Metacognition and Sense Making
in Mathematics, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MATHEMATICS TEACHING AND LEARNING 334
(Douglas A. Grouws ed., 1992).
153. Susan S. Stodolsky, et al., Student Views About Learning Math and Social Studies, 28
AM. EDUC. RES. J. 89, 110 (1991). The authors suggest that this difference may be due to the
divergent manners in which the two subjects are taught. While mathematics courses at the
elementary level rarely involve “[a]pplication, experimentation, discovery or inquiry,” courses in
social studies offer “more avenues of access to learning.” Id. at 112.
154. Id. at 105. This is an important distinction for our purposes, as other research
demonstrates a similarity between the role of instructor-as-authority in the sciences and religion.
This topic is discussed further in the subsequent subsections.
155. See Barbara K. Hofer & Paul R. Pintrich, The Development of Epistemological Theories:
Beliefs About Knowledge and Knowing and Their Relation to Learning, 67 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 88,
126 (1997) (citing W. M. Roth & A. Roychoudhury, Physics Students’ Epistemologies and Views
About Knowing and Learning, 31 J. OF RES. IN SCI. TEACHING 5 (1994), and S. Carey & C. Smith,
On Understanding the Nature of Scientific Knowledge, 28 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 235 (1993)).
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markedly.156 These students
saw knowledge in science as more certain and unchanging than in
psychology; were more likely to regard personal knowledge and
firsthand experience as a basis for justification of knowing in
psychology than in science; viewed authority and expertise as the
source of knowledge more in science than in psychology; and
perceived that in science, more than in psychology, truth is attainable
by experts.157

Although many questions about differences in epistemological
perception across academic domains remain unanswered, the current
research indicates that students, from at least the fifth grade through their
college years, perceive mathematical and scientific knowledge as more
authoritative and factual than knowledge learned in the social sciences
and humanities.158
Another possible explanation for making a constitutionally-relevant
distinction between academic domains is the observation that course
labels often act as a proxy for significant differences in the way causalanalytic systems are treated in various academic contexts. Courses in
mathematics and the so-called “hard sciences”—physics, chemistry, and
biology—generally provide students with instruction in the underlying
theory and application of a specific causal-analytic system.159 Students

156. See Barbara Hofer, Dimensionality and Disciplinary Differences in Personal
Epistemology, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 378 (2000).
157. Id. at 394.
158. Although the results are somewhat preliminary, research indicates that the degree to
which students’ epistemological perception differs between the various academic domains varies as
a function of age. See Hofer & Pintrich, supra note 155, at 120–23. At an early age, students
perceive knowledge received in all of the disciplines as factual, determinable and certain; younger
students are more likely to view teachers as authority figures than are older students. The older a
student becomes, the more likely she is to perceive differences in the nature of knowledge learned in
the various fields, and the less likely she is to attribute authority to teachers in the humanities and
social sciences. See id. at 121 (noting that there is general agreement that, as children move towards
adulthood, “the view of knowledge is transformed from one in which knowledge is right or wrong to
a position of relativism and then to a position in which individuals are active constructors of
meaning, able to make judgments and commitments in a relativistic context.”). Thus, the rationale
for inclusion of religious material in the social sciences and humanities is most applicable to older
students who exhibit a tendency to differentiate between the epistemological qualities of knowledge
gained in the two domains.
159. See Richard A Duschl & Richard J. Hamilton, Introduction: Viewing the Domain of
Science Education, in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 5 (Richard A Duschl & Richard J. Hamilton eds., 1992) (“The process of
science is one of developing and testing theories to explain phenomena. . . . Science curricula need
to be built around the development, testing, and restructuring of scientific theories if students are to
‘do science,’ and not simply learn ‘about science.’”); see also JANET DONALD, LEARNING TO THINK:
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 41 (2002).
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are generally expected to apply this system to a set of problems on
homework sets and examinations to generate the “correct” answer (i.e.,
the answer that is consistent with the causal-analytical system’s axioms).
The correct answer is typically an effect which, according to the causalanalytical system, results from specific causes in a particular manner.160
For example, students enrolled in an introductory course in physics will
be instructed on the fundamentals of Newtonian mechanics and will be
expected to apply this system of cause-and-effect to analyze hypothetical
problems that represent real-world phenomena. As presented in the hard
sciences, a causal-analytic system is to be taken as a relatively accurate
model of the universe’s functional machinery.
Although courses in the social sciences—history, psychology,
sociology, and economics—may include material on specific causalanalytic belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs, scientific theories, political
philosophies, etc.), these systems often serve merely as an impetus
driving the true focus of a humanities course: human behavior.161 The
social sciences typically deal with at least two tiers of causal-analytic
systems. On the upper tier is the overarching causal-analytic system that
details the effect of human behavior on observed phenomena. A typical
upper tier claim is “an upward shift in the demand curve without an
accompanying shift in the supply curve results in a price increase;” here,
the demand curve shift is a cause that brings about the effect of rising
prices. On the lower level is a causal-analytic system that describes how
various parameters affect human behavior. The effect in the lower tier
causal-analytic system thus becomes the cause in the upper tier system.
Continuing our example, we may wish to know why consumers in a
market are more interested in a given product such that the demand curve
will shift. The causes for such increased demand can be sociological (in
the case of a new fashion trend), scientific (as when a previously useless
material is discovered to have technical advantages over its molecular
competitors) or even religious (for example, where the demand for
Bibles increases due to an influx of new converts). On the lower tier, the
personal beliefs of human beings often serve as critical causal factors
affecting behavior. A comprehensive social science course should
therefore discuss the effects of particular beliefs on the actions of the
subjects of study.162 However, because the important inquiry in the social
160. Or, in the alternative, the answer might take the form of a particular cause that is
necessary (or sufficient) to explain the described effect.
161. See ARTHUR A. HYDE & MARILYN BIZAR, THINKING IN CONTEXT 166–67 (1989)
(providing a list of “general orientations” of the social studies and their “key concepts,” each of
which involves a specific behavior of human beings); see also DONALD, supra note 159, at 134.
162. See Donald H. Bragaw & H. Michael Hartoonian, Social Studies: The Study of People in
Society, in CONTENT OF THE CURRICULUM 226 (Allan A. Glatthorn ed., 2d ed. 1995) (advocating
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sciences is not whether a particular belief is right or wrong but, rather,
how it can be expected to affect the believer’s actions, an evaluation of
personal causal-analytic systems can be accomplished without presuming
the system’s “truth.” For example, students of modern American history
might study the religious beliefs of the “Heaven’s Gate” cult in order to
understand how their eschatology led to a mass suicide. These students,
however, need not be asked to take a position on whether the predictions
of the group’s leaders—namely, that the members’ suicide would enable
them to board a comet-trailing spaceship—came to pass.
The difference, then, between the physical and social sciences’
treatment of causal-analytic systems is this: the hard sciences apply
causal-analytic systems as a presumably accurate model of observable
events, while the social sciences allow for a treatment of causal-analytic
belief systems in such a way that they are valuable not as an accurate
model of observable events but as a means to predict what the human
subject of study believes is an accurate model of observable events.163
The constitutional relevance of the distinctions between the hard
sciences, social sciences, and humanities is discussed in the sections that
follow. However, before we proceed to this analysis, a word of warning
is in order. Distinctions based on the treatment of causal-analytical
systems are likely untenable at the level of course designation; rather,
such distinctions must be made at the level of particular lessons. It is
quite possible that a nominal science course could be taught more like a
history course, in which the evolution of scientific thought from the
Greek natural philosophers to the modern scientific academia is
presented. In such a course, the introduction of religious ideas as an
impetus for a given school of scientific thought might be constitutionally
proper. On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of history lessons
taught in a way that violates the Establishment Clause. While it may be
appropriate to mention Catholicism as a motivation of the Spanish
conquistadors, for example, a history lesson which characterized the
Spanish conquest of native populations as the inevitable result of God’s
Holy Will would certainly run afoul of the First Amendment. The
relevant difference is that the former theory proposes the historical

policy studies curricula that “create frames of deliberation in which students’ personal values can be
juxtaposed with the values and beliefs of others and the larger societies of which they are
members”).
163. This differentiation is quite similar to Greenawalt’s proposal that the truth-value assigned
to ideas as proposed in various pedagogical contexts should prove constitutionally determinative.
See Greenawalt, supra note 151, at 339 (stating that “[t]he obvious remedy for present neglect is for
schools to say more about religion while withholding judgments about religious truth. . . . Much
depends on particular complaints about particular subject matters, on the depth of treatment that is
suggested for religion . . . .”).
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actors’ own religious beliefs merely as a motivation for their actions,
while the latter describes historical events as the result of supernatural
agency. Clearly then, the focus should remain on the particular treatment
of causal-analytical systems—which, in general, differs between courses
in the hard sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities—rather than
the nominal label of a given course. For its purposes, this paper will
define the social sciences as those disciplines that focus on human
behaviors and that allow for the examination of causal-analytic beliefs as
a means for understanding the behavior of those who possess those
beliefs. The social sciences thus include disciplines such as economics,
sociology, psychology, and history. The hard sciences are defined as
those courses that apply a coherent causal-analytical system to predict,
explain or model natural phenomena in a manner that is independent of
human action. Examples of the hard sciences would be mathematics, the
physical sciences, and the life sciences. The humanities functions as a
catch-all group, subsuming fields such as literature, music, philosophy,
and the arts; in each of these fields, the manner in which causal-analytic
systems are treated is ambiguous. With these principles in mind, we
proceed to evaluate the constitutionality of religious instruction in these
three general domains of public school curricula.
2. Religion, as intelligent design, in the hard sciences
The relationship between religion and science is commonly
conceived in one of two ways: (1) religion and science are entirely
separate spheres of inquiry, applicable under different circumstances and
(2) religion and science are at odds, competing to explain natural
phenomena with entirely contradictory theories. Depending on one’s
view of the proper relations between naturalism and scientific reasoning,
either one of these conceptions may be correct.164 Regardless of the
philosophical position one takes on the role of naturalism in science,
however, there exist two critical similarities between the religious and
scientific realms. First, religion and science both involve claims about
processes of cause-and-effect in the natural universe. The main
distinction between the two in this regard is the nature of the causal
factors each invokes: while science is bound by the strictures of
methodological naturalism, religion allows for, and almost always
includes, the interference of one or more supernatural agents in the
natural order. Second, people (especially children) learn about religious
164. Those who believe that science requires ontological naturalism will see religion as a
direct metaphysical competitor, while those who limit scientific claims to the strictures of
methodological naturalism will likely acknowledge that religious and scientific views may coexist.
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and scientific entities, and judge their truth-value, in a very similar
manner.165 Because scientific and religious hypotheses are, in fact, highly
related from a structural and pedagogical standpoint, a science course
could easily be transformed into a vehicle for religious education by
simply opening the door to supernatural agency.166 In this sense, courses
in science dwell in precarious constitutional territory: one seemingly
minor curricular alteration could transform a standard biology or physics
class into a constitutionally-prohibited program of religious
indoctrination. For various reasons, the Establishment Clause tests
recognize this danger and prohibit the inclusion of religious propositions
in science courses. Each of these tests is applied below to a specific
religious proposition, the Intelligent Design hypothesis.
We first consider the application of the Lemon test. As an initial
matter, there is no reason to believe that instruction on the Intelligent
Design hypothesis would necessarily foster entanglement with religious
groups. Certainly, the ideas proposed by Intelligent Design theorists
could be incorporated into standard biology textbooks without the need
for significant administrative interaction with their religious sponsors.
Thus, the entanglement prong of the Lemon test poses no barrier to
religious instruction in public school science courses.
Intelligent Design advocates have argued that inclusion of the
hypothesis in public school science curricula furthers the critical secular
purpose of exposing students to potent criticism of standard scientific
dogma, thus satisfying Lemon’s second prong.167 While it is true that
exposure to the process of scientific peer review is a valid secular
purpose of scientific education, it is also true that scientific critiques of
Darwinian evolution can be presented without the religious trappings that
accompany the Intelligent Design hypothesis. The supposed flaws of
evolutionary theory are quite separate from a proposed supernatural
resolution.168 Thus, while the state may have a valid secular purpose in
exposing students to the type of scientific criticism of Darwinist

165. See Paul L. Harris & Melissa A. Koenig, Trust in Testimony: How Children Learn About
Science and Religion, 77 CHILD DEV. 505 (2006). See also Paul L. Harris, et al., Germs and Angels:
The Role of Testimony in Young Children’s Ontology, 9 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 76 (2006).
166. Obviously, “religion” often involves more than mere claims of supernatural intervention
in the natural order. For one, religions often preach guidelines for action in the natural world in the
form of moral rules. Thus, introducing students to the notion of supernatural agency is not
tantamount to comprehensively teaching a given religion. However, supernatural agency is a
uniquely religious concept and, therefore, to teach the interference of supernatural agents in the
natural order is to teach a religious idea.
167. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 762 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
168. In fact, much of the criticism leveled by Intelligent Design theorists has already been
resolved by naturalistic modifications to the Theory of Evolution, rendering supernatural
explanations unnecessary.
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evolution that forms the basis of the Intelligent Design hypothesis, there
is no secular justification for presenting the hypothesis’ inference of
supernatural agency. The Intelligent Design hypothesis thus fails the
second prong of the Lemon test.
Additionally, the primary effect of teaching the Intelligent Design
hypothesis in a public school science course is to advance religion. As
mentioned above, the major difference between the Theory of Evolution
and the Intelligent Design hypothesis is the latter’s inference of
supernatural agency, a religious notion. Because the Theory of Evolution
is already taught in schools and because it is possible to present technical
criticism of the Theory of Evolution without introducing an inference of
supernatural agency, inclusion of the Intelligent Design hypothesis adds
only one thing to the science curriculum: a religious belief. The
Intelligent Design hypothesis therefore fails the primary effect prong of
the Lemon test.
Under the endorsement test, the key inquiry is whether a reasonable,
objective observer would interpret the inclusion of the Intelligent Design
hypothesis in a public school science curriculum as a state endorsement
of religion.169 But what is the identity of the reasonable, objective
observer of such a curricular maneuver? At the very least, students who
are exposed to the Intelligent Design hypothesis as part of their
coursework are direct observers of the school board’s policy.170
However, it may also be that members of the community at large are
aware of the policy, and thus constitute part of the listening audience.171
If a reasonable, objective observer belonging to either group perceives
government endorsement of a religious view, then the policy fails Justice
O’Connor’s test.
In evaluating whether a reasonable, objective student would infer
state endorsement from a science curriculum that included the Intelligent
Design hypothesis, the key is context. As was discussed in Section
III.B.1, students tend to lend higher credence to information they are
taught in hard science courses than they do in other courses. The material
learned in the context of a science class is viewed as “factual” and
“certain.”172 Also, students tend to view their science teachers as
authorities from whom this factual, certain information is to be

169. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 869 (2005).
170. In this sense, schoolchildren are analogous to “the members of the listening audience”
mentioned in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe. 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000).
171. In Kitzmiller, Judge Jones noted that the Dover School Board’s distribution of a
newsletter explaining their policy and public defense of their actions brought the community at large
into the policy’s audience. 400 F. Supp. 2d at 715–16.
172. Hofer & Pintrich, supra note 155, at 126.
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learned.173 A reasonable, objective student would, by virtue of these
epistemological assumptions, presume that the state—in the form of the
school district and the science instructors in its employ—endorses the
accuracy of material included in the scientific curriculum. Thus, were a
district to present the Intelligent Design hypothesis in science classes
without a complementary presentation on the Theory of Evolution, a
reasonable, objective student would almost certainly infer state
endorsement of the hypothesis. However, because the Intelligent Design
hypothesis is likely to be presented alongside its rival, the Theory of
Evolution, it is less clear that the students would infer state endorsement
of either causal-analytic system. The mere fact that competing theories
are presented in tandem—implying that neither theory is
incontrovertible174—might counteract any message of endorsement
inherent to the context of science.
Even if a reasonable, objective student would infer state endorsement
of the Intelligent Design hypothesis by virtue of its inclusion in the
science curriculum, it is questionable, for two reasons, whether such a
student would view the Intelligent Design hypothesis as a religious
notion. First, it is unclear whether the endorsement test is to be applied
through the eyes of religious adherents or non-adherents.175 This
ambiguity could play an important role in applying the endorsement test
to the Intelligent Design hypothesis. Religious students are far less likely
to equate the Intelligent Design hypothesis, with all of its technical
sophistication and abstract claims, with religious faith. To the faithful,
Intelligent Design would seem a rather Spartan faith, lacking many
features common to modern theologically-sophisticated religion (such as
community, ritual, revelation, etc.). However, non-religious students—
especially the atheists among them—are more likely to perceive the
supernatural claims of the Intelligent Design hypothesis as religious in
nature. Thus, whether the reasonable, objective observer infers state
endorsement of the Intelligent Design hypothesis will likely depend on
the religious persuasion of the observer. Second, it is questionable
whether even the most reasonable and objective of elementary, middle,

173. Id.
174. From a scientific standpoint, this is certainly a fallacious message. However, the First
Amendment does not necessarily require that schools accurately relay the scientific community’s
opinion to students.
175. Professor Tribe argues that, although Justice O’Connor implies, in Lynch, that the proper
frame of reference is that of a non-adherent, her “analysis seemed to proceed from the perspective of
an adherent.” TRIBE, supra note 116, at 1292–93. Tribe further asserts that “in deciding whether a
government practice would impermissibly convey a message of endorsement, one should adopt the
perspective of a non-adherent; actions that reasonably offend non-adherents may seem so natural and
proper to adherents as to blur into the background noise of society.” Id.
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or high school students is capable of appreciating the anthropological and
legal rationale for defining religious beliefs as those founded on abstract
notions of supernatural agency. In any case, if the reasonable, objective
student is attributed this intellectual sophistication, then it is far less clear
that such a student would naively infer state endorsement of an idea
merely because it is presented within the context of a science class.
In sum, it is unclear whether a reasonable, objective student would
infer state endorsement of the Intelligent Design hypothesis and
simultaneously deem such a belief religious. Although students are
highly likely to infer state endorsement of material presented in the
context of a science course, it is possible that the hypothesis could be
presented in such a way that minimizes or even eliminates entirely this
message of endorsement. Also, it is questionable whether the student
audience will detect a religious message in a presentation of the
Intelligent Design hypothesis.176 A similar analysis applies to reasonable,
objective adult members of the community who, while more likely to
perceive the Intelligent Design hypothesis as a religious notion, would be
less likely to perceive state endorsement of the hypothesis.
Lastly, we consider the coercion test. As was discussed above, both
religious and scientific systems seek to explain the causes of natural
phenomena. It is fundamentally a scientific exercise to propose a causal
process that conforms to the rigors of methodological naturalism.
Similarly, it is fundamentally a religious exercise to attribute causation to
a supernatural agent, especially in the context of creation. Instruction on
the Intelligent Design hypothesis in a science course would result in
obvious coercion if students are required to derive, apply, or argue for
the hypothesis on their class work. This is especially true if grades are
determined on the basis of whether students obtained the “correct”
answer consistent with the Intelligent Design causal-analytic system,
which would necessarily involve the attribution of causation to a
supernatural agent. But, even if students are not required to apply the
Intelligent Design hypothesis on written class work, any presentation of
the hypothesis would require students to sit quietly while observing the
teacher engage in the religious exercise of inferring a supernatural
creator from evidence found in the natural universe. Such a scenario is
equivalent to the plight of the graduating students in Lee v. Weisman,177
176. This observation results from the limits placed on the analysis of this paper, which
excludes the religious pedigree of Intelligent Design hypothesis and the affiliations of its proponents
from consideration in the interest of evaluating a particular hypothetical situation. If this information
is made available to objective, reasonable observers, it is far more likely that they would detect a
religious message. In fact, the Kitzmiller opinion found a violation of the endorsement test primarily
on these grounds. See 400 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
177. In fact, the policy in this hypothetical case would be even more coercive than the prayer
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and would thus violate the Establishment Clause’s “minimum guarantee”
against coercion.
In summary, instruction on the Intelligent Design hypothesis in
public school science courses fails at least two of the three tests that
appear in the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
therefore may not be presented without violating the First Amendment.
The hypothesis’ failure of these tests, however, is quite dependent on the
specific epistemological perception of scientific knowledge and
pedagogical structure of science courses. When viewed under the Lemon
and coercion tests, the hypothesis fails because of the parallel structure of
scientific and religious hypotheses; because science and religion, as
causal-analytic systems, both seek causes to natural phenomena, the
addition of supernatural agency to the scientific curriculum leads to
instruction in a religious hypothesis. Given the particular assumptions of
this paper, analysis of the Intelligent Design hypothesis under the
endorsement test yields no clear result. Although the high
epistemological truth-value students assign information gained in science
courses and the heightened deference students are likely to give science
instructors lead to a high probability that students would infer state
endorsement of the hypothesis when presented in a science course, such
inferences would likely be attenuated by complementary instruction on
the Theory of Evolution. Because these considerations are unique to the
hard sciences, however, a similar analysis performed on courses in the
social sciences is likely to yield different constitutional conclusions.
3. Religion in the social sciences
While the Supreme Court has consistently found religion-infused
public school science curricula to be in violation of the Establishment
Clause, the Court has implied on at least two occasions that religious
topics could be taught in the context of history courses without offending
the First Amendment.178 The reason for this intuitive distinction between
the physical and social sciences’ respective treatments of religion
becomes apparent when religious instruction in the context of a social

in Lee v. Weisman, as attendance in science classes is far less voluntary than is attendance at a
graduation ceremony. See 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
178. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (stating that “[i]t certainly
may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have
said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a
secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.”). See
also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (noting that “study of religions and of the Bible
from a literary and historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education, need not collide with the First Amendment’s prohibition . . . .”).
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science course is analyzed under the three Establishment Clause tests.
The following analysis assumes that instruction in the social sciences
adheres to the definition of the social sciences described in Section
IV.B.1—namely, courses in the social sciences are those that focus on
the behavior of human beings and in which the discussion of religious
causal-analytic systems may be limited to the role such systems play in
motivating individuals or groups.
Instruction on religious concepts in a social sciences course is first
analyzed under the rubric of the Lemon test. As an initial matter, the
entanglement prong presents no problem. The state is perfectly capable
of accessing and including within their educational materials information
about various religious groups without the aid or intrusion of the groups
themselves. Secondly, there is a clear secular purpose to educating
students of the social sciences on the important influence religious
doctrine and organizations have wielded—and continue to wield—on
human society. As Justice Clark noted in Schempp, “[i]t might well be
said that one’s education is not complete without a study of . . . the
history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of
civilization.”179
The most pertinent question under the Lemon test, then, is whether
the discussion of religious doctrine in the context of a social sciences
course would have a principle or primary effect that either advances or
inhibits religion. Obviously, religious doctrine could be presented in such
a way in a social sciences course that either advantages or inhibits
religion. However, neither effect inevitably flows from the study of
religious material in the context of the social sciences. While religious
notions taught as causal-analytic systems in the hard sciences—due to
the structural similarities between scientific and religious systems and
the students’ general epistemological perception that scientific claims are
truthful—inherently advance religion, the social sciences allow room for
objective, even-handed evaluation of religious notions and their effects
on human behavior as well as an acknowledgment that such beliefs are
subjective and not necessarily indicative of metaphysical truths. This is
true because the social sciences often employ human beliefs as merely
one causal factor affecting human behavior. Students in a history course,
for example, might learn that Christian beliefs served as justification for
the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition as well as an impetus driving the
American abolitionist movement. Such an objective presentation would
eliminate any advantages or disadvantages to the religion under scrutiny.
A presentation of religion that conforms to the Supreme Court’s

179. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
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condition, “presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education,” will pass this key prong of the Lemon test; treatments of
religion that stray from objectivity, towards either an unduly negative or
positive bent, would fail to meet the requirements of the Establishment
Clause. In any case, the key observation is that the social sciences, in
contrast to the hard sciences, allow for objective, secular treatment of
religious beliefs. Therefore, the presentation of religious ideas in the
context of a social sciences course would not necessarily have a principle
or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
We next consider Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test. The analysis
under this test is similar to that performed under the Lemon test. As
mentioned above, the mere inclusion of religious material in the social
sciences curriculum need not create any entanglement problems. The
remaining question, then, is whether instruction about religion within a
course on the social sciences would necessarily be read as state
endorsement of religious ideas. There are several reasons to believe that
a reasonable, objective observer, in the form of either a typical student or
member of the community, would not presume state endorsement of
religious notions merely by virtue of their inclusion in the social sciences
curriculum. First of all, observers may very well infer state endorsement
of the truth of the material presented to them in the context of the social
sciences. However, the claims of truth regarding religious material as
presented in the social sciences, by definition, need not be equivalent to
claims of the truth of religious doctrine or accuracy of the religious
causal-analytic system; rather, the relevant truth-claim in the social
sciences may be that certain beliefs are (or were) held by certain people,
and that these beliefs in some way influenced their behavior. It is state
endorsement of this “upper tier” claim about the causal effects of
subjective religious beliefs on the believers, and not the truth of the
religious claims themselves, that, in the context of the social sciences, a
reasonable, objective observer would likely perceive. Second, research
shows that students typically view material taught in the social sciences,
as opposed to the hard sciences, as less dependent on authority for
validation. Students are therefore less likely to seek authority for—and
thus less likely to perceive state endorsement of—claims presented in the
context of the social sciences than they are for claims presented in a
course on the hard sciences. For these reasons, the inclusion of religious
material in the social sciences curricula need not violate the endorsement
test.
Finally, we come to the coercion test of Lee v. Weisman. It was
argued above that instruction on religious notions in the context of the
hard sciences violated the Establishment Clause’s prohibition of
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coercion. This conclusion was based on the rationale that, because of the
structural similarity in scientific and religious systems, the infusion of
supernatural agency into an otherwise scientific causal-analytic system
resulted in a religious system. Social science courses, on the other hand,
need not require students to participate in or observe religious exercises.
Religion, in the context of the social sciences, may be presented as a
historical fact and as a force motivating human behavior. Students of
history or sociology need not engage in the religious practice of
attributing causation for observed phenomena to the intervention of a
supernatural agent; rather, students need only understand how belief in a
supernatural agent might have affected the human subject of their study.
It was argued in Section III.A.4 that the former exercise is fundamentally
religious in nature. However, there is no reason to believe that the latter
process is uniquely religious. Thus, the social sciences allow for
treatment of religious material in a manner that does not coerce religious
exercise. Nor is it necessary for the purposes of the social sciences to
expose students to religious exercise in a manner analogous to the
controversial prayer in Lee v. Weisman. Social science teachers, in the
process of introducing the religious beliefs of the individual or group
under study, need not perform the religious act of inferring supernatural
agency from empirical data or claiming that supernatural agency is a
valid means for understanding natural phenomena; rather, they may
simply present the relevant ideas as the beliefs of a group external to the
students who comprise the class. The presentation of religious ideas
within the context of a social science course can therefore be
accomplished without transgressing the Establishment Clause’s
“minimum guarantee.”
In summary, there is no reason to believe that religion could not be
presented in social science courses without violating the Establishment
Clause. Of course, it is certainly possible to infuse a social science course
with an unconstitutional treatment of religion. For example, a history
instructor could, when describing the influence of Christianity on the
emancipation movement, improperly insist that the North’s victory in the
American Civil War was due to God’s direct intervention on behalf of
Southern slaves.180 However, in contrast to the hard sciences, there is no
inherent quality of the social sciences which renders instruction on
religious material within their context a fundamentally religious practice.
While religion-infused social science curricula must therefore be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, it is clear that the public school
180. That such a claim would be constitutionally improper does not imply that a
complementary moral claim—that the North’s temperament towards slavery was morally superior—
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
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curriculum is not entirely off-limits to religious material. It is feasible
that the Intelligent Design hypothesis could be presented in a social
science course—perhaps a history course that examines major cultural
phenomena in twenty-first century America—without violating the First
Amendment.
4. Religion in the humanities
In addition to the social sciences, Justices Clark and Fortas have
suggested that instruction on religious notions might be permissible in
the context of humanities classes (specifically, literature and comparative
religion).181 An evaluation of religious beliefs as taught within the
context of the humanities involves considerations quite distinct from
those surrounding religious instruction within the sciences. On the one
hand, students view knowledge gained in the humanities as even less
authoritative than that presented in the context of the social sciences.182
Thus, students are unlikely to infer state endorsement of religious beliefs
presented within the context of the humanities and, therefore, the
presentation of religious ideas in humanities courses would be expected
to pass Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test. On the other hand, the
treatment of causal-analytic systems in the humanities is more
ambiguous than in the sciences. The humanities, unlike the social
sciences, do not necessarily treat causal-analytic belief systems as merely
a relevant characteristic of the human subjects of study. It was the
peculiar treatment of causal-analytic systems in the social sciences that
was shown to render the study of religious ideas within their context
permissible under the Lemon and coercion tests. The key question, then,
is whether religious ideas may be presented in humanities courses in a
way that neither has a primary effect of advancing religion nor
improperly coerces respect for religious exercise. On both of these
counts, the specific nature of the academic discipline is likely to be
determinative. We briefly explore the application of the Lemon and
coercion tests to the presentation of religious beliefs in courses on
comparative religion, literature, and philosophy.
In Schempp, Justice Clark implied that instruction on religious topics
might be permissible in the context of the comparative study of
religions.183 While comparative religion is certainly a study of the beliefs

181. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
182. See Michael B. Paulsen & Charles T. Wells, Domain Differences in the Epistemological
Beliefs of College Students, 39 RES. IN HIGHER EDU. 365, 372–75 (1998).
183. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (stating that “In addition, it might well be said that one’s
education is not complete without a study of comparative religion. . . . Nothing we have said here
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and behavior of human beings, and is therefore similar to social sciences,
the comparative study of religion does not necessarily explore belief
systems in the interest of understanding the motivations for non-religious
human action. Rather, comparative religion courses focus more closely
on religious belief systems for their own sake. What, then, explains
Justice Clark’s intuition that religious material might be presented as part
of a comparative religion course without offending the First
Amendment? There are two possible responses. First, it could be that the
nature of comparative religion courses is such that the causal-analytic
systems under study are attributed to groups external to and distinct from
the group of students. In this sense, comparative religion courses are
similar to courses in the social sciences in which students study groups
with whom they are not expected to identify, and are quite different from
courses in the hard sciences in which students are clearly expected to act
like scientists.184 Such an externalization of the causal-analytic beliefs
might prove sufficient to eliminate the threat of coercion. Second,
comparative religion courses come with a ready-made anti-establishment
feature: namely, they provide such a wide survey and critical analysis of
religions (and, perhaps, non-religions or anti-religions) that they convey
no advantage or disadvantage to, and imply no state endorsement of,
particular religions or religion in general. A balanced, objective survey of
human religious beliefs might, by its very nature, simply avoid these
Establishment Clause pitfalls.
Literature is yet another domain in which religious material might be
presented in public schools. Both Justices Clark and Fortas have
suggested that religious texts, including the Christian Bible, might
permissibly be studied in public schools for its literary qualities.185
Whether such a presentation complies with the Establishment Clause
likely depends on the particular manner in which literature is evaluated
in a given course. Donald lists thirteen distinct methods of literary
criticism that might be applied to evaluate a text, including (among
others) moral and philosophical criticism, historical criticism, rhetorical
criticism, formalism, and structuralism.186 An evaluation of a religious
text under the rubric of moral and philosophical criticism, which focuses
on the truth and usefulness of a work’s substantive ideas, would almost
certainly violate the Establishment Clause. However, an analysis of a

indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.”).
184. Duschl & Hamilton, supra note 159, at 5 (implying that a goal of scientific education
should be to encourage students to “‘do science,’ and not simply learn ‘about science’”).
185. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
186. DONALD, supra note 159, at 248–49.
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religious text by means of historical and rhetorical criticism, which
emphasizes the relation of the text to historical events, or under the
lenses of formalism and structuralism, which evaluates the grammatical,
syntactic and structural merits of a text, could potentially satisfy the
Lemon and coercion tests. The relevant distinction is in the way the
various methods of criticism treat the substantive ideas, including any
causal-analytic claims, presented within a literary work. Where moral
and philosophical criticism is primarily concerned with the merits of a
text’s substantive claims, the other methods remain indifferent to the
truth of a given work’s substantive ideas. Literary analysis of a religious
text that maintains indifference towards the text’s substantive claims
would likely pass both the coercion and Lemon tests. Such a presentation
would not coerce students to practice religion because the literary and
historical analysis of a religious text is not necessarily a religious
endeavor. And, the secular purposes of such study—including instructing
students on the historical relevance of religious texts as well as their
influence on literature—overwhelm any benefit or detriment that would
accrue to religion. However, the presentation of a religious text in public
schools under any circumstances carries a high risk of abuse. The
balance between secular purposes and undue benefit to religion is, in this
case, a precarious one. If the Bible or another religious text is to be
presented in public schools, it must be treated as merely a work of
literature, written by mortal men. Any implication that the work
possesses special significance (aside from its influence on history,
literature, art, etc.) would convey an undue advantage to religion,
resulting in an Establishment Clause violation.
Finally, we consider the discipline of philosophy. Unlike history,
comparative religion, and literature, the Supreme Court has never
specifically implied that religious notions could be presented in the
context of a philosophy course. However, philosophy is a domain in
which religious ideas would be expected to arise in an ambiguous
epistemological and metaphysical context and, therefore, presents an
interesting case for application of the principles elaborated in this paper.
For example, a comprehensive study of western philosophy would
almost certainly include the works of pluralists, such as René Descartes,
who propose the existence of substances external to the natural realm.
Typically, these supernatural substances take the form of supernatural
agents such as God or the soul. Under the supernatural agency definition,
pluralist philosophy would be identified as religious, despite its abstract
and sophisticated nature.187 Also, it could be that the Intelligent Design
187. In this sense, the pluralist philosophy is highly analogous to the Intelligent Design
hypothesis.
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hypothesis finds an academic home in philosophy. Should these ideas be
excluded from a public school education in philosophy? The answer is
unclear from the perspectives of both epistemological perception and
pedagogical structure. More research is needed to determine how
students perceive knowledge gained in the context of philosophy courses,
but at least one study has shown that scholars (but not necessarily
students) view philosophy, when compared to a set of thirty-six
academic subjects, as most similar to the study of history.188 Assuming
their perception of a subject tracks that of university-level scholars,
students might therefore view knowledge gained in the context of a
philosophy course as epistemologically equivalent to that obtained in
courses on the social sciences. This suggests that philosophy is an area in
which the risk of inferred state endorsement is low. In addition to
students’ epistemological perception of the material presented in a
philosophy course, the manner in which causal-analytic systems are
presented may allow for the inclusion of religious material in philosophy
courses. The nature of the subject matter one would expect to be taught
in a philosophy course allows for both hard science-type and social
science-type treatment of causal-analytic systems. On the one hand,
philosophy courses might present the notions of dualism and Intelligent
Design as legitimate causal-analytic systems in the science-type sense
(i.e., as a legitimate system with which to understand observed
phenomena). On the other hand, it may be that philosophy classes (at
least, on the level at which they are most likely to be taught in precollege education) function more like social science courses, merely
enumerating and exploring a history of philosophical thought rather than
presenting particular philosophical ideas as useful or “true” causalanalytic systems. The constitutionality of teaching pluralism would
therefore depend on the manner in which the topic is presented in a
philosophy course.
V. DOES TEACHING THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?
While it is clear that teaching the Intelligent Design hypothesis in
science courses violates the Establishment Clause, it has been suggested
that public school instruction on the Theory of Evolution also violates
the Establishment Clause. Two distinct arguments have been proposed in
188. Anthony Biglan, The Characteristics of Subject Matter in Different Academic Areas, 57
J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 195, 195–203 (1973). The similarity was judged along three dimensions:
“(a) existence of a paradigm, (b) concern with application, and (c) concern with life systems.” Id. at
195.
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this regard. First, it has been asserted that the Theory of Evolution has
attained the status of a religious belief,189 and thus public school
instruction on neo-Darwinist principles represents a straight-forward
violation of the Establishment Clause. However, the Darwinism-asreligion argument relies on a rather abstract, liberal definition of religion
that is not generally accepted by the anthropological community. Such an
understanding is certainly inconsistent with legal definitions of religion,
which view non-theistic religion as a rare exception to the general
equation of religion and theism.190 While two Supreme Court opinions
have implied the possibility that certain non-theistic systems might
qualify as religions,191 the Theory of Evolution almost certainly amounts
to an “essentially . . . philosophical view” and, therefore, is not entitled to
legal status as a non-theistic religious belief.192
Another argument proposes that because the Theory of Evolution
directly contradicts religious claims, it is a violation of constitutionallymandated neutrality towards religion to instruct students on Darwinism
without including complementary material on the religious beliefs that
the theory contradicts.193 If the Establishment Clause prohibits teaching
these religious views, say the proponents of this theory, then Darwinism
must be excluded as well.194 In a general sense, the premise of this claim
is incorrect: the Theory of Evolution need not contradict the general
religious claim that supernatural agents cause certain natural phenomena.
The principle of methodological naturalism that underlies science does
not equate to the strong metaphysical claim that natural causes are the
only causes that exist;195 rather, methodological naturalism represents the
weaker claim that science should merely limit its search for causal
mechanisms to those found within the natural world. Under this view, a
scientist would admit that supernatural causes may, in fact, exist, but
insist that speculation about such causes is simply not the province of
science. In other words, because the principle of methodological
naturalism falls short of the claim that science is the ultimate and
exclusive source for metaphysical truth, an understanding of science
based on methodological naturalism allows room for the Theory of

189. See generally MARY MIDGLEY, EVOLUTION AS A RELIGION (revised ed. 2002).
190. See discussion supra Part III.A.
191. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
192. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965).
193. See, e.g., Timothy A. Crater et al., Suggested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Concerning Kansas Science Education Standards 56–57 (2005), http://www.kansasscience2005.com
/Findings%20of%20fact%20final.pdf (arguing that Kansas state science standards which defined
science as a naturalistic enterprise violate government neutrality towards religion).
194. Id.
195. Such a claim is the essence of ontological—as opposed to methodological—naturalism.

226

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

Evolution to coexist with religious causal-analytic systems.
That said, it is true that the historical claims of the Theory of
Evolution are inconsistent with the doctrine of some specific faiths.
Thus, it would seem that teaching evolution in the public schools violates
Lemon’s prohibition of policies that either advance or inhibit religion.
However, the Supreme Court has consistently applied a preference for
the secular curriculum when it has come into conflict with religious
doctrine. This preference is based on the observation that, although many
secular areas of study contradict specific theological claims, such
contradiction is not the primary effect of secular education. For instance,
in Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court struck down a balanced-treatment
statute that would have required Louisiana schools to teach creationism if
the Theory of Evolution was presented.196 The balanced-treatment
legislation was trumpeted by its proponents as a paragon of church-state
neutrality.197 However, the Court disagreed, finding no secular purpose
and striking down the legislation as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.198 Edwards thus indicates that the Establishment Clause brooks
no instruction on religious beliefs in science courses under the pretense
of academic neutrality, but it does not answer whether instruction on
scientific theories contradictory to religious doctrine runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause. That answer was given in Epperson, in which the
Court unequivocally stated that the First Amendment neither requires nor
even allows the omission of scientific material from the public school
science curriculum on the ground that the material conflicts with
religious doctrine.199 If evolution cannot be removed from the classroom
for religious reasons without affecting an unconstitutional establishment,
then it can hardly be said that instruction on evolutionary theory amounts
to an establishment of religion. Despite the fact that the Theory of
Evolution contradicts the historical claims of many religious faiths, the
Court has clearly implied that the theory’s inclusion in public school
curricula does not amount to an unconstitutional establishment of
religion.

196. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987).
197. Id. at 619–26.
198. Id. at 595–96.
199. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1968) (stating that the First Amendment
“forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed
antagonistic to a particular dogma”); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505
(1952) (insisting that “the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from
views distasteful to them . . . .”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that while instruction on the Intelligent Design
hypothesis in a public school science-type curriculum would violate the
Establishment Clause, it is possible to present religious ideas in public
schools without transgressing the First Amendment. In developing this
argument, two important concepts were proposed. First, although
comprehensively cataloguing the range of beliefs that qualify as religious
under the First Amendment is likely an impossible task, a useful test that
defines religious ideas as those that invoke supernatural agency to
explain observed phenomena was proposed. Under this test, the
Intelligent Design hypothesis was shown to qualify as a religious notion.
Second, it was shown that the various academic domains differ
significantly in their treatment of causal-analytic systems as well as their
perceived epistemological character. The particular characteristics of the
hard sciences make courses in these subjects ill-suited for
constitutionally permissible instruction on religious ideas. However, as
implied by Justices Fortas and Clark, the social sciences and humanities
offer a more suitable pedagogical environment for the presentation of
religious beliefs in a manner consistent with the strictures of the
Establishment Clause. Thus, while the Intelligent Design theory may not
be taught as a scientific theory, similarly religious ideas could be
presented as part of the social sciences or humanities curriculum.
It is important to note that the analysis in this paper proceeded
irrespective of the intellectual pedigree of the Intelligent Design
hypothesis as well as the motivations or religious affiliations of
Intelligent Design advocates. Although the motivations of policymakers
and the known history of an advocacy movement are clearly relevant to
the evaluation of a given policy under the Establishment Clause, by
ignoring these features of the Intelligent Design hypothesis, it is possible
to craft an analysis of more general application. The Intelligent Design
hypothesis is similar to many ideas, such as pluralist metaphysics, that
are of undeniable academic interest. Understanding how the substance of
the Intelligent Design hypothesis interacts with the Establishment Clause
thus gives us a framework to evaluate the establishment consequences of
public school instruction on analogous concepts that lack clear ties to
religious organizations or advocacy groups. Under the framework
established in this paper, the presentation of such concepts would likely
be permissible in courses on the social sciences and humanities, but not
in the hard sciences. While the former allows for secular, objective study
of religious ideas, the latter presents the risk of state indoctrination—a
risk the Establishment Clause will not tolerate.

